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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the obligations company directors may owe to creditors after the advent 
of the Companies Act 1993 (the "93 Act"). Prior to the 93 Act's enactment, there was a body 
of anglo-antipodean case law, emanating initially from Australia but endorsed in both New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom, that prescribed the consideration by directors of the 
interests of creditors of the company in certain circumstances. Such consideration was often 
couched in the language of a "duty". Contemporaneously, in New Zealand the Companies 
Act 1955 (the "55 Act") provided obligations upon directors to refrain from permitting the 
company to engage in reckless trading and unreasonably incurring debts. These were 
recognised as obligations for the benefit of a company's creditors. The passing of the 93 Act 
witnessed the first express statutory formulation of the duties directors owe when engaged in 
the management of a company. Of relevance to this paper, sections 135 and 136 of the 93 
Act place duties upon directors to refrain from permitting their company engaging in activity 
that is likely to create a substantial risk of loss to the company's creditors or from incurring 
obligations the company has no reasonable chance of performing when required to do so, 
respectively. This paper examines the general scope of these new provisions using the 
previous 55 Act obligations to creditors as the starting point for analysing the provisions' 
content. A specific enquiry as to the continued relevance of the pre-93 Act anglo-antipodean 
case law advocating director consideration of creditors' interests is then undertaken. 
Part One of the paper introduces the topic. Part Two outlines the traditional conceptions that 
directors' duties are owed exclusively to the company or, alternatively, the shareholders, 
before proceeding to examine the judicial comment sympathetic towards the notion that 
directors may owe a duty to consider the interests of their company's creditors. The part 
concludes by outlining the parameters of this perceived duty, expressly addressing when the 
duty arises, to whom is it owed, what it requires of directors, its juridical source, and some of 
the conceptual difficulties therein. 
Part Three of the paper examines the provisions of the 93 Act. It initially explores the 
relationship between the statutory duties provided in the 93 Act and the considerable body of 
case law that previously regulated of directors' duties under the 55 Act regime and its 
WG953110.242 
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predecessors. It is submitted the pre-93 Act case law on the general nature of directors' duties 
will still be of considerable relevance to the interpretation of the statutory duties under the 93 
Act regime. Next, the duties contained in sections 135 and 136 of the 93 Act are examined 
and reference is made to substantially similar provisions from the 55 Act. Part Four analyses 
how the cases which evidenced judicial support for a common law directors' duty in relation 
to creditors would be treated under the 93 Act regime if they arose today. The part concludes 
by submitting the case law sympathetic to such a duty is likely to have little, if any, 
continuing relevance to director conduct under the new regime. The "mischief' of directors 
at issue in the case law would be typically proscribed by the provisions of the 93 Act, or if 
not, it is demonstrated the courts in the particular case law were not prepared to hold the 
directors culpable either. 
Finally, Part Five of the paper examines some of the policy issues and theoretical constructs 
surrounding the imposition of directors' duties aimed at protecting creditors. It is submitted, 
however, the "pragmatic" approach of the 93 Act is focussing upon the performance of 
company obligations, as sections 135 and 136 do, is appropriate in light of the fact patterns 
giving rise to judicial examination of director misconduct. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and appendices) 
comprises approximately words. 
The structure of this paper is divided into: "Parts" headed in the centre of the page with each 
word in capitals identified by capitalised roman numerals,· "Sections" headed at the left hand 
margin with the initial letter of each word capitalised and identified by capitalised letters, 
e. g. , ''A", "B", "C", etc,· "Subsections" headed at the left hand margin with only the initial 
letter of the first word of the subsection capitalised and identified by arabic numerals,· and 
finally, "Paragraphs" headed at the left hand margin with no capitalisation of any letters 
(unless a proper noun or defined term is employed) and identified by lower case letters, e.g. , 
"a", "b", "c", etc. 
WG953 l i 0.242 
I INTRODUCTION 
The legislation clearly has been framed to try to prevent the directors of a company 
sheltering behind the limited liability of a company in incurring debts, 1 do not think that 
a director must necessarily behave in a way that he would do if it was his own money that 
was being put at risk, as would be the case if he was incurring debt on his own behalf and 
not on behalf of the limited liability company ... One of the reasons why limited liability 
companies are permitted is so that a company may trade without being inhibited by the 
factors that would influence a person acting on his own behalf. Nevertheless, some regard 
must be had to the fact that directors have a responsibility akin to the responsibility they 
would have if they were acting/or themselves. The section appears to me to be designed to 
compensate those who have suffered loss as a result of directors' actions without unduly 
hampering the directors in their operation of a company. 
1 
Thus Hillyer J enunciated some of the competing policy considerations at work in an earlier 
legislative initiative2 designed to protect those who suffered loss as a result of the actions of 
directors. More recently, a clearly discernible body of judicial comment sympathetic towards 
creditors of insolvent companies has become apparent. This sympathy has evidenced itself 
through a series of cases from English and antipodean jurisdictions purporting to increase 
directors' duties at common law, duties which have traditionally been viewed as being owed 
exclusively to the company.3 
1994 witnessed the enactment of Companies Act 1993 (the "93 Act"). The 93 Act was a 
landmark upon New Zealand's company law vista, inter alia, for its positive exposition of the 
duties directors owe at law. No such positive duties had been previously provided in the 
Companies Act 1955 unamended (the "55 Act"), although that Act did contain some 
statements, albeit negatively expressed, which imposed liabilities on directors to creditors and 
minority shareholders (in circumstances of reckless trading 
4 and minority oppression,5 
respectively). The obiter dicta sympathetic to creditors' interests is, therefore, but part of the 
larger volume of complex case law that regulated director behaviour prior to the 93 Act. 
Vinyl Processors (New Zealand) Ltd (in liq) v Cant [ 1991] 2 NZLR 4 I 6; [ 1991] MCLR 33 (" Vinyl Processors") 
p 428; 45 , per Hillyer J. 
55 Act, section 320. 
See below Part II Section B Subsection I - The orthodox view: exclusively to the company. 
55 Act, section 320. 
55 Act, section 209. 
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Notable amongst the duties prescribed by the 93 Act are the duties to refrain from engaging a 
company in activity that is likely to create a substantial risk to loss of the company's 
creditors6 and from agreeing to the company incurring obligations it has no reasonable chance 
of performing. 7 This paper essentially investigates the likely scope of those new statutory 
duties, particularly enquiring what will become of the judicial sympathies supportive of a 
common law directors' duty regarding creditors with the advent of the 93 Act. 
The paper commences by surveying the body of case law prescriptive of an obligation on 
directors to consider the interests of their company's creditors, before outlining the perceived 
parameters of this common law duty and some of the conceptual issues involved therein. It 
then proceeds to examine the 93 Act, including its relationship to the general common law of 
directors' duties, and the substance of the section 135 and section 136 duties. A comparative 
analysis of how the fact patterns of the cases propounding support for the common law duty 
in regard to creditors would be determined under the 93 Act is then undertaken to ascertain 
the continuing relevance, if any, of the common law duty. Finally, the paper explores some 
of the policy considerations regarding the concept of directors' duties to creditors at a more 
abstract level. 
93 Act, section 135. 
93 Act, section 136. 
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II COMMON LAW FORMULATIONS OF DIRECTORS' DUTIES: 
A DISCRETE DUTY TO CREDITORS? 
A Introduction: Trustees, Agents Or Creatures Of Statute? 
Directors of companies have traditionally enjoyed broad powers of administration. 8 As a 
means of controlling directors in the exercise of those powers, the common law devised a set 
of principles which were collectively termed "directors' duties". The standards of conduct 
expected of directors by the courts has been said to be both strict and lax, the discrepancy 
being attributed to the court's need to balance the competing obligations of fettering 
uncontrolled director discretion and avoiding unnecessarily stifling management via 
excessive judicial control.9 
In earlier times it was often stated that directors were trustees and that the nature of their 
duties could be explained on that basis. 10 However, to describe directors today as trustees is 
perceived neither to be strictly correct or helpful. 11 Rather, directors are perceived to be 
agents of the company. As agents, directors are said to be in a fiduciary relationship vis-a-vis 
the company, their principal. 12 But even clarification as a fiduciary shed little light upon the 
nature of directors' duties. 13 It is submitted that perhaps the most accurate description of the 
nature of a director accords with the observation of Lord Russell that directors "are the 
creatures of statute and occupy a position peculiar to themselves". 14 As a general matter then, 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
J H Farrar and M W Russell Company Law and Securities Regulation in New Zealand, Butterworths, Wellington 
1985 ("Farrar & Russell") p 223. 
Farrar & Russell , above n 8, p 223. 
It is easy to see how this idea arose. Prior to 1844 most joint stock companies were unincorporated and depended 
for their validity upon a deed of settlement vesting the property of the company in trustees. It was common for 
the directors to also be the trustees. With the advent of incorporated companies, although the description of 
"trustee" was less apposite, it was not unnatural for the courts to extend it to them by analogy. First, the duties of 
directors should have been the same regardless of the incorporation or otherwise of the company, and secondly, 
equity invariab ly labelled anyone in a fiduciary position a trustee. See generally, L C B Gower Gower's 
Principles of Modern Company Law, 4th ed, Stevens & Sons, London, 1979 ("Gower"), chapter 24. 
Gower, above n I 0, p 571 , where the author cites Romer J in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co [ 1925] Ch 407 
("City Equitable"), p 426 as authority. 
LS Sealy "The Director as Trustee" [1967] Camb L J 83, p 86. 
See Farrar & Russell , above n 8, where the authors quote the comments of Frankfurter J in Securities and 
Exchange Commission v Chenery Corporation 318 US 80 ( 1943), pp 85-86: 
But to say a man is a fiduciary only begins the analysis; it gives direction to jiJrther inquiry, to whom is 
he a fiduciary? what obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? in what respects has he failed to 
discharge these obligations? and, what are the consequences of his deviation from duty? 
Regal Hastings v Gulliver Ll942] All ER 378, p 387. 
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the common law identified several heads under which directors owed duties, 15 although these 
were admitted not to be exclusive and could overlap. 16 With regard to the general taxonomy 
of directors' duties, the duties of loyalty and good faith commanded higher standards of 
directors' behaviour than the lower standards of skill and care expected. 17 Of particular 
pertinence to this paper, however, is to whom those duties are owed. 
B Traditional Conceptions Of To Whom Directors Owe Duties 
J The orthodox view: exclusively to the company 
The orthodox and widely accepted conception of directors' duties is that they are owed 
exclusively to the company as opposed to individual shareholders, for example. 18 This begets 
enquiry as to what is meant by "the company". One notion suggested by the courts is the 
"hypothetical individual shareholder". 19 Other conceptions are existing members, future 
members, and extensions to include creditors, employees or other interest groups.20 The issue 
. . h 21 1s one not wit out controversy. In attempting to give meaning to the company as an 
abstract notion, strength is given to the argument for an identity between the company as a 
whole and its shareholders, due to the capacity of shareholders to ratify directors' breaches of 
their duties ex-post. Moreover, the notion that directors' duties are owed exclusively to the 
company has been controversial for the limitations it places upon who may enforce directors' 
duties. The rule is considered harshest where it operates to deny an individual shareholder 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
The major common law duties on directors are: they must act bona fide in the best interests of the company; they 
must not exercise their powers for an improper (collateral) purpose; they are obliged to exercise the reasonable 
care and skill expected of persons of their knowledge and experience; and finally, they must not place themselves 
in a position where their duty to the company and their own interests conflict. See Farrar & Russell , above n 8, 
chapt 36. 
Farrar & Russell , above n 8, p 224. 
Gower ascribes this difference to the historical trustee analysis of directors' duties. The good faith requirements 
upon directors were virtually identical to those required of trustees, whereas the duty of a trustee was to be 
cautious and avoid risk of the trust property, in contrast to business managers who must, perforce, take risks. See 
Gower, above n I 0, p 572. 
Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421, where directors purchased shares from their shareholders without disclosing 
that they were in the process of negotiating a takeover bid at a higher price. It was held that since the directors 
owed no fiduciary duty to the shareholders they were not liable for non-disclosure. 
See Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1951] I Ch 286, p 291. 
See H A J Ford and R P Austin Ford's Principles Of Corporations Law, 6th ed, Butterworths, Sydney, 1992 
("Ford"), p 466, para 1435. 
Ford, above n 20. 
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standing to sue in respect of a breach of a directors' duty, as the shareholder is not considered 
a beneficiary thereof. Indeed, the rule has been heavily censured for this limitation.22 
2 A duty to shareholders? 
There is, however, New Zealand case law to suggest that courts recognise that directors owe 
duties to their shareholders in certain circumstances.23 Coleman and Other v Myers24 is 
authority for this proposition.25 In the High Court, Mahon J held that Percival v Wright had 
been decided "per incuriarn" ,26 and that directors could owe fiduciary duties to their 
shareholders in the context of a takeover.27 On appeal, the Court of Appeal rejected 
Mahon J's reading down of Percival v Wright. Rather, the court was content to recognise the 
particular circumstances of the case gave rise to a fiduciary duty to shareholders, which the 
directors had breached. Thus, the fiduciary duty was not occasioned merely by the director-
shareholder relationship. Cooke J, for example, was at pains to emphasise the special facts 
giving rise to the duty.28 The upshot of Coleman v Myers is, therefore, not to limit Percival v 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
See, Report of Cohen Committee (UK), Command Report 6659, paras 86-87 and Report of Jenkins Committee 
(UK), Command Report 1749, para 89, noted in Farrar & Russell , above n 8, p 225; and the comments of Mahon J 
in Coleman v Myers , see below n 24. 
There is also other Commonwealth authority supporting the notion, for example, in Ge thing v Kilmer [ 1972] I All 
ER 1166, p 1170 where Brightman J took the view that where a takeover bid has been made, the directors of the 
offeree company were under a duty (which included a duty to be honest and not to mislead) to their own 
shareholders. 
[1977] 2 NZLR 225 ("Coleman v Myers"). 
Coleman v Myers concerned a takeover of a family company at an undervalue by a new company formed by one 
of the directors of the family company. 
"Per incuriam" roughly translates to "lack of care" . A decision of a court is made per incuriam if it fails to apply a 
relevant statutory provision or ignores a binding precedent. In summarising counsels' submissions on the point, 
Mahon J had the following to say as to how legal commentators perceived Percival v Wright : 
The Cohen and Jenkins Committees on Company law in the United Kingdom each recommended the 
enactment of legislation in abrogation of the decision in Percival v Wright. Professor Cower has 
referred to the judgment as a "calamitous decision". P R Adams in Company Directors in Australia 
(2nd ed) 146-147 expresses a view that it must be doubted whether the case should now be followed. 
Professor Loss, one of the leading American experts on the American Securities £'Cchange legislation 
and himself a member for some time of the legal staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission, in an 
article, "The Fiduciary Concept as Applied to Trading by Corporate 'Insiders' in the United States" 
(/9 70) 33 MLR 34, 40-41 , said that Percival v Wright was "a monument to the ability of lawyers to 
hypnotise themselves with their own creations". 
The particular duties expressed were not to mislead the shareholders and to disclose material matters to them. 
Coleman v Myers, above n 24, p 280: 
I accordingly accede to the submission of Mr Wallace that on the facts of this case, where the director of 
a private company made an offer to shareholders to purchase shares he had a duty to disclose to such 
shareholders any material fact of which to his knowledge, they were unaware, and which reasonably 
might from an objective viewpoint, materially affect the decision of those shareholders as to whether 
they would sell or as to the terms of sale. 
See Coleman v Myers , above n 24, p 330. Such factors included the family character of the company, the position 
of the directors in the company and family, their high degree of inside knowledge, and the manner in which the 
takeover was conducted and shareholders persuaded. 
WG953 I I 0.242 
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Wright to its facts, so much as to demonstrate that additional factors, for instance inequality 
of bargaining power, may ameliorate the effect of the rule in the latter case. 
3 Impact of the 93 Act 
The foregoing overview of case law on directors' duties is largely mirrored in the statutory 
regime provided by the 93 Act. The 93 Act expressly recognises certain duties as being owed 
to shareholders.29 Duties of directors relating to disclosure of interests and share dealings, 
and supervision of the share register, are said to be owed to shareholders.30 By contrast, the 
duty of care31 and the duties to avoid reckless trading and not to agree to a company incurring 
certain obligations comprised in sections 135 and 136 of the 93 Act, are owed to the company 
as an abstraction, and specifically not to shareholders. 32 The relationship of the 93 Act to the 
common law is explored subsequently.33 
C The Courts' Extension Of Directors' Duties To Include Creditors 
I Introduction: a derogation from the traditional conception? 
Purportedly one of the more interesting developments in the field of company law prior to the 
93 Act was the extension of directors' duties to provide protection for companies' creditors.34 
For nearly two decades, in a growing number of decisions, the courts evidenced a sympathy 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
93 Act, subsection 169(3) provides: 
Certain duties owed to company but not shareholders Without limiting subsection (I) of this section, the duties 
of directors set out in -
(a) Section 90 of this Act (which relates to the duty to supervise the share register) ; 
(b) Section 140 of this Act (which relates to the duty to disclose interests); 
(c) Section 148 of this Act (which relates to the duty to disclose share dealings) -
are duties owed to shareholders while the duties of directors set out in -
(d) Section 131 of this Act (which relates to the duty of directors to act in good faith and in the best interests 
of the company); 
(e) Section 133 of this Act (which relates to the duty to exercise powers for a proper purpose); 
(f) Section 135 of this Act (which relates to reckless trading) ; 
(g) Section 136 of this Act (which relates to the duty not to agree to a company incurring certain 
obligations); 
(h) Section 137 of this Act (which relates to a director's duty of care); and 
(i) Section 145 of this Act (which relates to the use of company information)-
are duties owed to the company and not to shareholders. 
93 Act, paragraphs 169(3)(a), (b) & (c). 
93 Act, section 137. 
See above n 30 .. 
See below Part Ill Section A - The Relationship Between The 93 Act And The Common Law As To Directors' 
Duties. 
See R Grantham "The Judicial Extension of Directors' Duties to Creditors" [1991] JBL I ("Grantham"), p I. 
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for the plight of creditors by prescribing recommendations as to director behaviour inclusive 
of considering the interests of creditors. In doing so they have seemingly been prepared at 
times to disregard the traditional conception that directors' duties are owed exclusively to the 
company, which, as noted, was usually equated with its shareholders.35 This has therefore 
involved an extension of the orthodox conception of directors' duties.36 The following 
section of the paper surveys the case law by jurisdiction before outlining the discernible 
parameters of the judicially formulated directors' duty in regard to creditors. 
2 Judicial observations regarding directors' obligations to creditors 
a the Australian strand 
The first real attempt to establish that directors should give consideration to the impact of 
their actions upon creditors was the Australian High Court decision Walker v Wimborne. 37 
Mason J's dictum appears to have become the starting point for all ensuing expositions of the 
concept:38 
The directors of a company in discharging their duty to the company must take account of the 
interests of its shareholders and its creditors. Any failure by the directors to take into account the 
interests of creditors will have adverse consequences for the company as well as for them. The 
creditor of a company ... must look to that company for payment. His interests may be prejudiced by 
the movement of funds between companies in the event that the companies become insolvent.
39 
An important issue throughout the cases is when the duty will arise. The debate concerns 
whether insolvency is significant or not. Mason J's statement contains nothing to suggest 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
See above, Part II Section B - Traditional Conceptions Of To Whom Directors Owe Duties. 
Prior to 1975 and the Walker v Wimborne decision, see below n 37, the cases uniformly reject the idea that 
creditors' interests may be taken into account. See Re Wincham Shipbuilding Boiler & Salt Co. (1878) 9 Ch D 
322; Re Drawjield Silkstone Coal Co. (1881) 17 Ch D 76; and Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22, cited in D A 
Wishart "Models and Theories of Directors' Duties for Creditors" ( 1991) 14 NZULR 323 ("Wishart"), p 325. 
(1976) 50 ALJR 446; (1975) 137 CLR I. Noted by R Barrett (1977) 40 MLR 226 ("Walker v Wimbome"). 
Above n 37, p 449; 5 (emphasis added). 
Walker v Wimborne, above n 37, involved a liquidator's misfeasance summons under section 3678 of the New 
South Wales Companies Act 1961. The summons was in respect of, first, a pension to a retired director, secondly, 
an intergroup loan between two insolvent companies. thirdly, salaries paid by an insolvent company, and fourthly, 
an intergroup payment by an insolvent company for work that was never done. On appeal the Australian High 
Court held the lower court had rightly rejected the first cause of action, but wrongly the second, third and fourth . 
For an exposition of the fact pattern of Walker v Wimborne see below Part IV Section C Subsection I - Walker v 
Wimborne. 
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insolvency triggers the duty to take account of creditors' interests.40 Indeed, Mason J appears 
to have envisaged future prejudice in the event that the company became insolvent. 
Another Australian case, Ring v Sutton, 41 is support for the suggestion that the duty to 
consider creditors' interests extends beyond the insolvency of the company. In the case, the 
New South Wales Court of Appeal examined a transaction which was entered into when the 
company was solvent.42 The court noted the transaction at issue did not benefit the company, 
was in fact detrimental to it, and was designed in order to benefit a director of the company.43 
A further issue with regard to the parameters of the duty is ratification of a possible breach by 
shareholders. In this regard, Hope J A noted, in response to an argument that shareholders 
had consented to the transaction at issue and therefore the liquidator could not complain: 44 
The present case is one that concerns the interests of creditors and it has not been nor could it be 
suggested that they approved or affirmed the terms of the loan contracts. 
In so rejecting the possibility of shareholder ratification, Hope J arguably perceived the duty 
breached as being owed to the company's creditors and thus the conduct of the company's 
shareholders was irrelevant. 
In 1986, the New South Wales Court of Appeal again had an opportunity to consider 
creditors' interest. Kinsela and Anor v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd (in liq),45 in contrast to Ring v 
Sutton for example, saw the court emphasise an insolvency/solvency dichotom/6 as to when 
40 
4 1 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
The company was, however, insolvent at the time of the impugned transactions. See J Dabner "Directors' Duties -
The Schizoid Company" (1988) Co & Sec LJ 105 ("Dabner"), p 106. 
(1980) 5 ACLR 546. 
In Ring v Sutton a loan at less than market rates was entered into whilst the company was solvent but was held to 
be detrimental to the creditors' interests. It was successfully challenged in a misfeasance summons by a liquidator 
in a creditors' voluntary winding up. For an exposition of the fact pattern of Ring v Sutton see below Part IV 
Section C Subsection 2 - Ring v Sutton. 
See above n 4 I where the court noted: 
None of the three transactions was for the benefit of the company, their terms as to interest were 
detrimental to the company and were arrived at/or the benefit of the respondent and the respondent was 
able to procure the terms because of his position as a director. 
Ring v Sutton, above n 41, p 548. 
( 1986) 4 ACLC 2 I 5 (" Kinsela"). 
See below n 4 7 and accompanying text. 
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the interests of creditors should be considered.47 On the facts, the company was clearly 
insolvent at the time of the challenged transaction, so it was unnecessary for the court to 
formulate a general test as to the degree of financial instability required to impose upon 
directors an obligation to consider the interests of creditors. Again, in the context of 
shareholder ratification of directors' actions, Street C J stated directors' duties incorporate not 
prejudicing the interests of creditors:48 
It is, to my mind, legally and logically acceptable to recognise that, where directors are involved in a 
breach of their duty to the company affecting the interests of shareholders, then shareholders can 
either authorise that breach in prospect or ratify it in retrospect. Where, however, the interests at risk 
are those of creditors I see no reason in law or logic to recognise that the shareholders can authorise 
the breach. Once it is accepted, as in my view it must be, that the directors' duty to a company as a 
whole extends in an insolvency context to not prejudicing the interests of creditors (Nicholson & Ors 
v Permakraft (N .Z.) Ltd and Walker v Wimborne) the shareholders do not have the power or authority 
to absolve directors from that breach. 
Street C J's dictum also gives an indication as to the rationale behind the duty to creditors, 
noting that insolvency substantively meant the assets of the company under the management 
of the directors are the creditors and not the shareholders: hence the duty.49 
In another 1986 decision, Grove v Flavel, 50 the Supreme Court of South Australia was, in 
contrast to Kinsela, required to delineate the degree of insolvency required to give rise to the 
duty. 51 The issue before the court was whether the director in question had made improper 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
Kinsela, above n 45, concerned the validity of a lease granted by the company whilst in a state of imminent 
collapse to two of its directors. On the facts the aim of the transaction was to put the assets beyond the reach of 
creditors. The lease had been approved by all the shareholders. For an exposition of the fact pattern of Kinsela 
see below Part IV Section C Subsection 3 - The Kinsela case. 
Kinsela, above n 45, p 223. 
Kinsela, above n 45, p 221 , where Street CJ commented while: 
In a solvent company the proprietary interests of the shareholders entitle them as a general body to be 
regarded as the company ... where a company is insolvent the interests of the creditors intrude ... It is in 
a practical sense their assets and not the shareholders' assets that ... are under the management of the 
directors .. . 
(1986) 4 ACLC 654. 
The facts of Grove v Flavel, above n 50, was that a director of seven companies had been charged with seven 
breaches of the duty not to make improper use of information namely, that a particular company was 
experiencing liquidity problems. The director, in possession of such knowledge, had effected a round robin 
movement of cheques amongst the company facing ir.solvency, himself, and other of the debtor and creditor 
companies he controlled. The result was that the debt to the director was reduced, and the director and companies 
which had previously been debtors of the troubled company became debtors of another company, which had 
previously been a creditor of the troubled company, thus effectively extracting the troubled company from the 
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use of information. Jacobs J, after referring to Kinsela and New Zealand's Permakraft case52 
and noting that the insolvency/solvency distinction was not rigidly applied (especially by 
Cooke J in the latter case) concluded that the duty to creditors not only arises when the 
company is insolvent but also where the director has "knowledge of a real risk of 
. l 11 53 mso vency . Whether there is such a real and perceived risk of insolvency apparently 
depends upon the facts of each case. With regard to the type of conduct that would breach the 
duty, Jacobs J noted: 
A director of a company X Limited who upon acquiring information which leads him to believe that the 
company faces a risk of liquidation ... which is real and not a remote risk and thereupon acts to protect 
himself and other companies which he is a director from the consequences of such liquidation to the 
possible detriment of creditors of X Limited is acting improperly. 
It has been suggested Grove v Flavel is authority that liquidators have a cause of action for 
breach of duty against a director who entered into a transaction at a time when the director 
perceived the company was in financial difficulties and a creditor of the company suffers a 
loss as the result of the transaction. 54 
The final case of the Australian strand of common law supporting a directors' duty to 
creditors is Jejfree v National Companies and Securities Commission. 55 In Jejfree the Full 
Supreme Court of Western Australia was unanimous that the failure of directors to ensure that 
creditors were adequately covered in the context of a rearrangement of the financial affairs of 
the company was fatal to the director. 56 The company director, Jeffree, was sued by the 
52 
53 
54 
SS 
56 
arrangement. For an exposition of the fact pattern of Grove v Flavel see below Part IV Section C Subsection 4 -
Grove v Flavel. 
See below n 59. See below Part II Section C Subsection 2 Paragraph b - New Zealand authority & Part IV Section 
b Subsection I - Permakraft. 
Grove v Flavel, above n 51, p 663. 
Dabner, above n 40, p I 09. 
( 1989) 15 ACLR 217; 7 ACLC 556 ("Jef(ree"). 
The facts of Jeffree, above n 55, are these : Mr Jeffree was a director of a company known as Wanup Limited. 
Wanup Limited was the trustee of Mr Jeffree's family trust. It carried on a swimming pool business for the 
beneficiaries of the trust. A dispute had arisen between Wanup Limited and another company Leighton Limited. 
That dispute was sent to arbitration. Jeffree feared that an award would be made against Wanup Limited and that 
it would not have sufficient assets to satisfy the award. He sought legal advice which he understood authorised 
him to incorporate a new corporate trustee, Cassidy Limited, the establishment of a new family trust with the same 
director/shareholders and beneficiaries as were involved in the Wanup Limited family trust, and the transfer of the 
assets and business of Wanup Limited to Cassidy Limited for full value. This was accomplished on the facts. As 
anticipated, following the transfer of the assets to Cassidy Limited, the arbitrator made a substantial award against 
Wanup Limited (now a shell). Jeffree was convicted under section 229(4) of the Companies Code (Aust), see 
below n 57 by the Stipendiary Magistrate, and an appeal dismissed, the Court was satisfied that Jeffree had 
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liquidator for a breach of section 229(4) of the Companies Code(Aust)57 and convicted. 
Martin S M, at first instance, after noting that a director who acts in the best interests of the 
company is free from any possible criticism, held that where financial difficulties confront a 
company the duties of directors become quite different. At that stage, directors have to take 
into account the concerns of creditors and failure to do so results in a breach of duty. The 
Full Court agreed with this approach. Significantly, Brinsden J emphasised that the duty was 
owed to both present and future creditors. 58 
b New Zealand authority 
The matter of directors' duties to creditors was considered in some depth by New Zealand's 
Court of Appeal in the 1985 landmark decision Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ.) Ltd (in liq). 59 
The case, like almost all in this area, involved proceedings by a liquidator.60 The High Court 
held the directors, in failing to take account of the interests of the company or its creditors, 
were guilty of a breach of duty. An appeal was allowed by the Court of Appeal against the 
finding that the directors had not considered the interests of the company because the finding 
ran contrary to the evidence. The company was solvent and there existed sound commercial 
reasons for the restructuring. The court concluded the decisions of the directors could, 
therefore, be regarded as reasonable at the time and not unfair to creditors. 
Cooke J did, however, entertain some important dicta concerning the question of a duty to 
creditors: 61 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
obtained an advantage for himself and Wanup Limited by ensuring that all the assets of Wanup were removed 
before the creditor Leighton Limited could get at those assets. The fact that the assets had been transferred at full 
value was irrelevant for determining whether there had been a breach of the section. 
Companies Code (Aust), section 229(4) provides: 
An officer or employee of a [company] shall not make improper use of his position as such an officer. .. to gain, 
directly or indirectly, an advantage for himself or for any other person or to cause detriment to the [company]. 
Jeflree, above n 55 p 228; p 566, where Brinsden J noted: 
The advantage he [Jeflree] got however, was, that he was able to continue lo work/or the same business 
under a fresh corpora le structure unimpeded by claims of a prospective creditor ... 
[ 1985) I NZLR 242 ("Permakraji"). 
In Permakraji, above n 59, the company had been restructured in 1975 by the incorporation of a new company, 
Holdings, the distribution of a capital profit upon revaluation of properties, the purchase by the company's 
shareholders of shares in Holdings and a simultaneous sale of most of their shares in the company to Holdings. 
The effect of this scheme was to reduce the pool of assets available to creditors. Two years later the company was 
ordered to be wound up and the liquidator commenced proceedings to recover the amount of the capital dividend. 
For an exposition of the fact pattern of Permakrafi see below Part IV Section B Subsection I -Permakrafi. 
Permakraji, above n 59, p 249 (emphasis added). 
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The duties of directors are owed to the company. On the facts of particular cases this may require the 
directors to consider inter alia the interests of creditors. For instance creditors are entitled to 
consideration, in my opinion, if the company is insolvent or of doubtful solvency, or if a 
contemplated payment or other course of action would jeopardise its solvency. 
The criterion should not be simply whether the step will leave a state of ultimate solvency according to 
the balance sheet, in that total assets will exceed total liabilities ... Balance sheet solvency and the 
ability to pay a capital dividend are certainly important factors tending to justify proposed action. But 
as a matter of business ethics it is appropriate for directors to consider also whether what they do 
will prejudice their company's practical ability to discharge promptly debts owed to current and 
likely continuing trade creditors. 
To translate this into a legal obligation accords with the now pervasive concepts of duty to a 
neighbour and the linking of power with obligation ... In a situation of marginal commercial solvency 
such creditors may fairly be seen as beneficially interested in the company or contingently so ... 
The recognition of duties to creditors ... is justified by the concept that limited liability is a privilege. ft 
is a privilege healthy as tending to the expansion of opportunities and commerce; but it is open to 
abuse. Irresponsible structural engineering - involving the creating, dissolving or transforming of 
incorporated companies to the prejudice of creditors - is a mischief to which the Courts should be 
alive. But a balance has to be struck. There is no good reason for cultivating a paternal concern to 
protect business people perfectly able to look after themselves ... 
Further to these comments about the directors' duty to the company, Cooke J also added there 
existed a possibility of an action by creditors against the directors or the company for a 
breach based in negligence. 62 Although concern has been noted that these comments suggest 
Cooke J was contemplating a duty of care owed directly to creditors,63 it is apparent from his 
comments that any such duty would be fact specific. In summary, Cooke J appears to have 
propounded an objective test based on whether directors ought to have known the particular 
activity was likely to cause loss to creditors. 64 Further, where such a duty is owed, the 
unanimous consent of shareholders will not be sufficient to justify the breach of duty, merely 
compounding rather than excusing the breach as against the creditors. 
62 
63 
64 
Permakrafi, above n 59, p 250, where Cooke J stated the duty to the company: 
... does not exclude the possibility of an action by a particular creditor against the directors or the 
company for breach of a particular duty of care arising on ordinary negligence principles. 
See Grantham, above n 34, p 7. 
As such, Cooke J adopted the approach of Cumming-Bruce and Templeman LJJ in Re Horsley & Weight Ltd 
[1982] Ch 442, pp 454-456, where both Lord Justices favoured an objective approach. Permakrafi, above n 59, p 
250, per Cooke J. 
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Cooke J's obiter dicta was endorsed in the High Court a year later by Smellie J in Neil & Co 
Ltd (in rec) v Neil. 
65 Smellie J reproduced the passage of Cooke J quoted above,66 and while 
noting the passage was particularly apposite to the case before him, it was obiter dicta. 
Nevertheless, Smellie J felt the principles enunciated in the passage could be regarded as 
legitimate (when taking them into account for the purpose of exercising his discretion to 
remove a caveat under section 143 of the Land Transfer Act 1952).67 
Finally, in Hilton International Limited (in liq) v Hilton68 Tipping J considered the authorities 
on directors' duties in the context of the distribution of a capital dividend.69 He held the 
directors of a company, when declaring a dividend, owe a duty not only to the company but 
also to its creditors, of all kinds likely to be affected, to act in accordance with the legal 
principles relating to the making of distribution. 70 In so doing, Tipping J, as Smellie J had 
done in Neil, endorsed Cooke J's dicta in Permakraft: 71 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
I respectfully agree with the approach suggested by Cooke Jin the Nicholson v Permakraft case. As 
His Honour emphasised limited liability is a privilege which must be matched by certain 
responsibilities. There is no doubt about the duties of directors to act honestly and I do not consider 
that it is placing too burdensome a responsibility on them when declaring a dividend to consider the 
financial position of the company carefully so as to ensure that the dividend is not paid unless they 
honestly and reasonably believe that the company's financial health and its creditors will not thereby 
be jeopardised. 
( 1986) 3 NZCLC 99,659 ("Neil"). The matter arose in the context of a caveat lodged by the governing and sole 
director of an insolvent company against its only assets which he had agreed to buy the day prior to the bank 
appointing the receivers. The receivers purported to cancel the contract. Smellie J held the contract was void and 
possibly void ab initio . For an exposition of the fact pattern of Neil see below Part IV Section B Subsection 3 -
Neil. 
See text accompanying above n 65. 
See Neil, above n 65, where Smellie J noted : 
... the principles enunciated by Cooke J were distilled by him after full and detailed argument in which 
the law in England, Australia and New Zealand was traversed. When those principles are placed 
alongside the facts in this case I consider it legitimate to take the combined effect into account in 
exercising any discretion. 
(1988) 4 NZCLC 64,721 ("Hilton"). 
The dividend had been declared and paid when the company was experiencing liquidity problems. Although the 
facts of the case are complex, the issue was relatively simple; the liquidators arguing the capital dividend had been 
declared contrary to the law and either fraudulently or negligently. No fraud was found but it was held an 
unlawful return of capital took place which constituted a breach of duty. For an exposition of the fact pattern of 
Hilton see below Part IV Section B Subsection 2 - The Hilton case. 
Hilton , above n 68, p 64,751. 
Hilton, above n 68, p 64,750. 
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Tipping J also cautioned that ratification of directors' actions by the company's shareholders 
would not protect directors from a breach of such duty. 72 
c conflicting English dicta 
The first English case to consider the issue of creditors' interests was Lonrho Ltd v Shell 
Petroleum Co Ltd 73 in 1980. Diplock LJ in the House of Lords noted "the best interests of 
the company are not necessarily those of shareholders but may include those of the 
creditors". 74 However, subsequent decisions appeared comprehensively to reject the 
existence of a duty to creditors. The English Court of Appeal in Re Horsley & Weight Ltd 75 
in 1982 heard an argument by a liquidator that a payment of a pension to a director was in 
breach of a duty owed to the company's creditors to preserve its capital fund. Buckley LJ 
noted although it may be somewhat loosely said that the directors owe an indirect duty to 
creditors not to permit any unlawful reduction of capital to occur, it was in fact more accurate 
to say that the directors owe a duty to the company in this respect and if the company went 
into winding up, the liquidators owe a duty to enforce the right to repayment. 76 
Notwithstanding this apparent rebuke, other members of the court have often been cited as 
authority for recognising the existence of a duty to creditors.77 For example, Templeman LJ 
stated:78 
If the company had been doubtfully solvent at the date of the grant to the knowledge of the directors the 
grant would have been both a misfeasance and a fraud on the creditors for which the directors would 
be liable. 
Although it is arguable that the passage is acknowledgment by Templeman LJ of misfeasance 
in the form of a breach of a duty to creditors, it is also equally arguable that the passage refers 
to a misfeasance vis-a-vis the company and a fraud on the creditors. Directors have 
invariably been liable for fraud on creditors. Cumming-Bruce LJ concurred with Templeman 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
Hilton , above n 68, p 64,751 . 
[1980] I WLR 627 ("Lonrho") . 
Lonrho, above n 73, p 634. It should be noted His Lordship did not refer to any authority for the proposition and 
the passage arose by way of side remark incidental to the issues of the case. 
[1982] 3 All ER I 045 ("Horsley"). 
Horsley, above n 75, p 1055. 
Dabner, above n 40, p I 08 . 
Horsley, above n 75, p I 058. 
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LJ and together it has been said that these two judgments are "the strongest English authority 
for the proposition that a duty is owed to creditors". 79 
In Multinational Gas and Petroleum Co v Multinational Gas and Petroleum Services Ltd so 
the English Court of Appeal discounted the possibility of a duty to creditors. Unsurprisingly 
the case concerned an action by a liquidator.81 By a majority, it was held that where 
shareholders had approved the directors' acts, these became acts of the company and barred a 
claim by the liquidator against the company. Dillon LJ commented:82 
An individual trader who is solvent is free to make stupid but honest commercial decisions in the 
conduct of his own business. He owes no duty of care to future creditors ... A company ... likewise 
owes no duty of care to creditors. The directors indeed stand in a fiduciary relationship to the 
company as they are appointed to manage the affairs of the company and they owe fiduciary duties to 
the company though not to the creditors, present or future ... 
In contrast, possibly the strongest authority in support of a duty to creditors derives from the 
judgment of Templeman LJ in the House of Lords' decision Winkworth v Edward Baron 
Development Co Ltd & Ors83 where he affirmed his view in Horsley that a duty is owed to 
· 84 85 creditors. He stated, and the other law lords agreed: 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
.. . a company owes a duty to its cre,litors, present and future. The company is not bound to pay off 
every debt as soon as it is incurred and the company is not obliged to avoid all ventures which involve 
an element of risk, but the company owes a duty to its creditors to keep its property inviolate and 
available for repayment of its debts. The conscience of the company, as well as its management, is 
See Dabner, above n 40, p I 08. 
[1983] 3 WLR 492; [1983] 2 All ER 563 ("Multinational"). 
Multinational, above n 80, had complex facts that, however, the case basically gave rise to the issue of whether 
the shareholders of the company could ratify the conduct of directors who had entered the company into 
improvident contracts. The liquidator alleged that the directors were in breach of duty by virtue of entering into 
high risk contracts notwithstanding that the company was solvent at that time. 
Multinational, above n 80, p 514;585 ( emphasis added). 
[ 1987] I All ER I 14 (" Winkworth"). 
At issue in Winkworth, above n 80, was a claim by a wife in respect of an equitable interest in the proceeds of the 
sale of a matrimonial house. The proceeds had been paid into the overdrawn bank account of a family company 
of which the wife and husband were both shareholders and directors. The pair had used the company's funds for 
the purchase of shares in question and had caused the company to purchase a house which had served as the 
matrimonial house. Unknown to the wife the husband had mortgaged the house to Winkworth, forging his wife's 
signature in the process. The immediate issue was whether the wife had an equitable interest which prevailed over 
the mortgagee's. The House of Lords allowed the appeal by the mortgagee. For an exposition of the fact pattern 
of Winkworth see below Part IV Section D Subsection I - The Winkworth decision . 
Winkworth, above n 83, p 118 ( emphasis added}. 
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confined to its directors. A duty is owed by the directors to the company and to the creditors of the 
company to ensure that the affairs of the company are properly administered and that its property is 
not dissipated or exploited for the benefit of directors themselves to the prejudice of the creditors. 
Finally, a further decision of the English Court of Appeal has added to the obiter dicta that 
directors may owe duties towards their company's creditors, or perhaps more cautiously, that 
directors' duties, although owed to the company, include an obligation to have regard to the 
interests of creditors. The decision, Liquidator of West Mercia Safetywear Ltd v Dodd,86 
restricted the approach of the Multinational case to solvent companies and accepted that in 
the case of insolvent companies directors are under a duty to take creditors' interests into 
account when disposing of company property.87 
The case dealt with a liquidator's application for a declaration that the company's director, 
Dodd, was guilty of misfeasance and breach of trust in relation to the company. Although 
dismissed at first instance on the authority of Multinational, the Court of Appeal upheld the 
appeal. Dillon LJ88 held there was a clear fraudulent preference and thus misfeasance on the 
part of the director who owed a fiduciary duty to the company defrauded. The transfer 
constituted a fraudulent preference in disregard of the interests of the general creditors of the 
insolvent company. Dillon LJ, after approving Street CJ's dicta in Kinsela, 89 distinguished 
Multinational on the basis of solvency:90 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
In the Multinational case, at the time of the transaction which was in question, the company was amply 
solvent, and what the directors had done at the bidding of the shareholders had merely been to make a 
business decision on good faith, and act on that decision. It subsequently turned out to be a bad 
(1988) 4 BCC 30 (" West Mercia"). Noted by A Herzberg (1989) Co & Sec LJ 72. 
West Mercia , above n 86, concerned two related companies, A J Dodd & Co Ltd and its wholly owned subsidiary 
West Mercia Safetywear Ltd. Both companies had accounts with Lloyds Bank, West Mercia's being in credit 
whilst Dodd's was overdrawn. As security for the overdraft facility the Bank had a charge on the book debts of 
Dodd Limited, as well as a personal guarantee from Mr Dodd, who was a director of both companies. The book 
debts of Dodd Ltd included a debt of approximately £30,000 from West Mercia Ltd. Both companies were 
discovered to be insolvent. The directors were advised to place the companies in voluntary winding up and not to 
operate West Mercia Ltd's bank account until all procedural meetings had been called. Later both companies were 
placed in creditors' voluntary winding up. However, two weeks prior, Mr Dodd had, contrary to advice, instructed 
£4,000 to be transferred from West Mercia Ltd's account to Dodd Ltd's, the intention being to reduce Dodd Ltd's 
overdraft which Mr Dodd had guaranteed. For an exposition of the fact pattern of West Mercia see below Part IV 
Section D Subsection 2 - The West Mercia case. 
With whom Croom-Johnson LJ and Caulfield J agreed. 
See text accompanying above n 48. 
West Mercia, above n 86, p 33 . 
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decision, but the position had to be decided on the facts at an earlier stage where the company was 
amply solvent and the parties were acting in good faith. 
D The Parameters Of The Common Law Duty To Consider Creditors 
Thus, it is evident the courts in the angle-antipodean jurisdictions have demonstrated 
considerable sympathy with the plight of creditors of (predominantly) insolvent companies. 
From the foregoing it is possible to discern the basic elements of what has generally been 
conceded to be a common law duty to creditors.91 The parameters of the duty are, 
nevertheless, not clear cut and may equally be described as issues. 
1 To whom is the duty owed? to the company or to creditors 
./ 
As noted earlier, it has been a tenacious principle of commonwealth company law that 
directors' duties are owed to the company alone92 and not to third parties dealing with the 
company, such as creditors. The dicta contained in the foregoing section is clearly supportive 
of some duty running from directors to creditors. The importance of terminology cannot be 
understated, however. There is a clear distinction to be drawn between saying that a director 
owes a fiduciary duty to a creditor and stating that a director has a duty to consider the 
interests of creditors. The former not only imposes a duty upon directors but also, and 
significantly, implies that creditors can enforce the duty themselves. The latter rationalisation 
would oblige directors to consider the interests of creditors, but the duty would ultimately be 
owed to the company, and accordingly, it would be enforceable by the company alone.93 
The cases, where they do so, appear on the whole to articulate an orthodox conception of a 
directors' duty to creditors. Mason Jin Walker v Wimborne94 and Cooke J in Permakraft 95 
91 
92 
93 
94 
See Farrar, above n 8; L S Sealy "Directors 'Wider' Responsibilities - Problems Conceptual, Practical and 
Procedural" ( 1987) 13 Monash ULR 165 ("Sealy-Monash"); F Dawson "Acting in the Best Interests of the 
Company - For Whom Are Directors Trustees?" (1984) 11 NZULR 68 ("Dawson"); Dabner, above n 40; PD 
Giugni and J L Ryan "Company Directors' Spheres Of Responsibilty : Primary And Secondary Duties" [1988) 
NZLJ 437. 
See Percival v Wright, discussed above n 26, and generally - Part II Section B Subsection I - The orthodox view: 
exclusively to the company. 
This is the essence of the rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461. 
See Walker v Wimborne , above n 37, p 7, where Mason J declared (emphasis added): 
... in this respect it should be emphasised that the directors of a company is discharging their duty to 
the company must take account of the interests of its shareholders and its creditors. 
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endorsed such a formulation. The comments of Templeman LJ in Winkworth are inconsistent 
with this approach, however. His Lordship seemed to indicate in clear terms that the duty to 
consider the interests of creditors was owed not just to the company, but to the creditors 
themselves.96 Commentators have been critical of such an interpretation97 (notwithstanding 
the ambiguity of its expression), whilst Wishart, for example, is of the view the issue is as yet 
undecided. 98 
2 When will the duty arise? is insolvency necessary? 
This has been identified by many commentators as a crucial area of uncertainty.99 A number 
of the cases suggest the duty only arises, if at all, where the company is insolvent. For 
example, in West Mercia, Dillon LJ based his retreat from his dictum in Multinational on the 
ample solvency of the company in Multinational. Similarly, Street CJ's comments in Kinsela 
referred to creditors' interests only intruding m the case of an insolvent company. 
Furthermore, in Permakraft, Richardson J observed: "If a company is solvent in the sense of 
its assets exceeding its liabilities there can, I think, be no question of a separate duty to 
d. .,100 ere 1tors. The absence of consensus as to the meaning of "insolvency" adds to the 
Richardson J referred to a balance sheet conception of solvency 101 m the uncertainty. 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
IOI 
See Permakraft, above n 59, p 245, where Cooke J surmised (emphasis added): 
The duties of directors are owed to the company. On the facts of particular cases this may require the 
directors to consider inter alia the interests of creditors. 
This analysis is supported by Cooke J's later comments concerning the possibility if action being brought against a 
director directly by a creditor for a breach of a duty of care on ordinary negligence principles. See Permakraft, 
above n 59, p 250. 
See Winkworth, above n 83, p 117, where Templeman LJ said (emphasis added): 
A duty is owed by the directors to the company and to the creditors of the company to ensure that its 
property is not dissipated or exploited for the benefit of the directors themselves to the prejudice of 
those creditors. 
See CA Riley "Directors' Duties and the Interests of Creditors" 10 Co Lawyer 87, p 91 and Dawson, above n 91 , 
p 77 for example. 
Wishart, above n 36, pp 326 & 327, where he notes (footnotes omitted and emphasis added): 
Dicta of Cooke J in Nicholson v Permakraft, Lord Templeman in Winkworth v Edward Baron 
Development Co and Wallace J in Jeffree v National Companies and Securities Commission seem to 
support some sort of direct duty, but no case can be said to have decided the point .. 
For example, Wishart has identified the following unanswered questions: 
(i) Does the duty continue for the whole of the life of the company? 
(ii) If so, does the duty require greater or even prime consideration of creditors' interests as 
insolvency approaches? 
(iii) If the duty is not a continuing one, what event brings it into existence? Is it insolvency, and if 
so, what form of insolvency? If not, what triggers the degree of financial insecurity which 
should trigger the duty? Most cases refer at some stage to "doubtful solvency". 
See Wishart above n 36, p 329 (footnotes omitted). 
Permakraft, above n 59, p 254 
Balance sheet solvency is an excess of assets over liabilities. 
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foregoing dictum, as did Somers J in Permakraft, 
102 whilst Cooke J took a broader view 
noting both balance sheet solvency and liquidity solvency
103 were relevant. 104 
By contrast, it is arguable that the common law duty does not depend upon the company's 
insolvency (however defined). In Walker v Wimborne, Mason J appeared to accept that there 
was a continuing obligation irrespective of the financial health of the company, noting 
creditors could only ever look to the company for payment and thus would always be 
threatened by the possibility of future insolvency. In support of such an interpretation are 
Diplock LJ's comments in Lonrho, where in suggesting that the company's interests might 
include those of its creditors, no special circumstances such as insolvency appear necessary as 
. . h . f h d lOS a prereqms1te to t e existence o t e uty. In practice, however, it is submitted the 
imposition of a continuing duty to creditors whilst the company is solvent will be of little 
moment because the issue only gains any real significance upon pending or actual 
. 1 106 mso vency. 
3 The extent and content of the duty 
This is perhaps the most fundamental aspect of the duty and yet there appears a conspicuous 
lack of any meaningful attempt to articulate an adequate definition of exactly what directors 
are required to do. Are the interests of the creditors merely one competing interest to be 
borne in mind by directors in their running of the company? and if so, how much prominence 
are they to be given? This "competing interest" approach appears implicit in Mason J's 
comments in Walker v Wimborne, where he spoke of the need to take account of the interests 
of both the creditors and shareholders. 
107 Likewise, in Permakraft, Cooke J observed "on the 
facts of the particular case, this may require the directors to consider inter alia the interests of 
creditors" .108 The practicality of such an approach, however, is to be questioned. To talk in 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
Permakraft, above n 59, p 255. 
Liquidity solvency has been defined as the capacity to discharge its debts as they become due in the normal course 
of business. 
Permakraft, above n 59, p 249. 
See Lonrho, above n 75 , p 634. 
Wishart's comment: "It is obviously superfluous to require directors to take account of the interests of creditors 
when the company's debts will be paid as and when they fall due" is particularly apt. Wishart, above n 36, p 329. 
See above Part II section 7, subsection 2, paragraph (a) - The Australian Strand, in text accompanying above n 
[33]. 
Permakraft, above n 59, p 249 (italics added). 
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terms of competing interests seems to suggest that the duty owed prescribes consideration of 
varying claims, rather than the pursuit and championing of a particular group's interest. Such 
an approach has been the subject of criticism at a conceptual level.
109 It has been suggested 
that a duty expressed in terms of merely considering interests is, in effect, worthless, for the 
supposed beneficiary of the duty would never be able to show that their interests were not at 
least considered. At first blush, these sentiments appear pertinent to the concept of a common 
law duty to the company to consider creditors' interests.
110 
Two objections to these criticisms might be raised. First, one could query the extent to which 
any fiduciary duty imposed upon directors, including those to shareholders, is strictly 
enforceable. It can be argued that the separation of ownership and control, the reduced 
effectiveness of the general meeting as a means for controlling directors and the practical 
problems and limitations of the derivative action undermine the suggestion that even a duty 
expressed only in terms of considering shareholder's interests is itself not readily enforceable 
in practice. 111If this is accepted, , the discretion granted to directors by the inclusion of 
creditors' interests within the interests of the company is recognised as being of importance, 
rather than the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism. Although it is conceded there is 
some merit in this argument, it ought not to be overstated. If discretion to act, rather than 
compulsion to act, characterises the common law duty, then it pre-supposes that directors will 
wish to pursue this objective of their own volition. Directors have always been able to 
consider the interests of other groups, apart from shareholders, if to do so was in the long 
term interest to the shareholders.
112 Arguably, directors of their own volition have always 
had the discretion to consider creditors' interests. It may then be asked: what is added by a 
common law duty whose effectiveness lies not in its ability to compel compliance but merely 
in the discretion it grants to directors who wish to comply and have the discretion to do so 
already? 
109 
11 0 
Ill 
11 2 
Sealy-Monash, p 175 where the author notes: 
But where duties are owed to persons with potentially opposed interests, the duty bifuricates and 
fragments so that it amounts ultimately to no more than a vague obligation to be fair; and (however 
much we may decide ourselves) this kind of ''fairness", especially ina commercial context, is not a 
justiciable issue. 
Sealy-Monash, above n 91, pp 174 - 188. 
See M Stokes "Company Law and Legal Theory" in W Twining (ed) Legal Theory and Common Law cited in CA 
Riley "Directors' Duties and The Interests of Creditors" 10 Comp Lawyer 87, p 89. 
An example is the case of employees, where higher paid employees could be justified even though it may reduce 
profits and thus dividends, because in the long term it would foster better staff relations, attract and retain better 
workers and therefore increase long term profitabi lity. 
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A further response to the worthless duty criticism is perhaps more compelling. Demanding 
consideration of creditors is not tantamount to saying that a director can pay lip service to this 
procedural requirement. The duty should compel something more than a mere statement after 
the event that the directors gave a thought to the creditors (but then decided to act in a way 
contrary to their interests). Given the possibility of a liquidator or a creditor bringing a 
misfeasance proceeding
113 it is conceivable such a proceeding could act as a sufficient 
inducement for directors to follow the prescribed activity of considering creditors' interests. 
Thus, to this extent, the duty may possibly yet have real application. 
A final conceptual problem with a duty to consider several groups' interests is the ability of 
directors to comply in practice. Particularly where a company is insolvent, the interests of 
creditors and shareholders, for example, directly conflict. How is a director to discharge his 
or her duty to consider both these interests? The conflict, is perhaps best illustrated by the 
differing propensities of creditors and shareholders towards risk. How are directors to 
balance such competing interests when deciding whether to embark upon a speculative 
venture? Indeed, the courts have not been adverse to attempting to have it both ways. 
Templeman LJ's dictum in Winkworth is perhaps the best example, where he observed: 
114 
113 
114 
The company is not bound to pay off every debt as soon as it is incurred, and a company is not obliged 
to avoid all ventures which involve an element of risk, but it owes a duty to its creditors to keep its 
property inviolable and available for the repayment of its debts. 
Pursuant to the 93 Act, section 301. Subsection 301(1) provides: 
301(1) Court's Power If, in the course of the liquidation of a company, it appears to the Court that a person who 
has taken part in the formation or promotion of the company, or a past or present director, manager, liquidator, or 
receiver of the company, has misapplied, or retained, or become liable or accountable for,money or property of the 
company, or been guilty of negligence, default, or breach of duty or trust in relation to the company, the Court may, 
on the application of the liquidator or a creditor or shareholder,-
(a) Inquire into the conduct of the promoter, director, manager, liquidator, or receiver; and 
(b) Order that person-
(i) To repay or restore the money or property or any part of it with interest at a rate the Court 
thinks just; or 
(ii) To contribute such sum to the assets of the company by way of compensation as the Court 
thinks just; or 
(c) Where the application is made by a creditor, order that person to pay or transfer the money or property or 
any part of it with interest at a rate the Court thinks just to the creditor. 
Winkworth , above n 83, p 118. 
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It is, however, suggested that, provided the prescribed procedure has been followed by 
directors and there is evidence that each respective groups' interest was considered, the 
weight to be accorded to those interests in the final decision arrived at must be for the 
directors to determine alone. Moreover, , at least with the onset of insolvency, it is arguable 
that the interests of the company become the interests of the creditors alone, and that 
accordingly only that interest must be borne in mind and pursued by the directors.
115 Such a 
formulation would appear to largely mitigate the problems and weaknesses of the conflicting 
interests dilemma. Nonetheless, practical difficulties still remain. To talk of creditors' 
interests is to overlook that creditors are not a homogenous group. The unsecured creditor is 
clearly in a quite different position from the company's bankers who may hold a floating or 
fixed charge over the company's property as security for its overdraft. Similarly, secured and 
unsecured creditors. Would a decision to foreclose a company at a time when there are 
sufficient assets to pay off the secured creditors but no one else be in the creditors' best 
interests? Or, vice versa, if in a similar situation, the directors decided to continue trading in 
the hope of generating further assets to enable payment of the other creditors, they would be 
risking the company's ability to pay its secured creditors. Would this be an attempt to 
discharge the duty or an obvious breach of it? Cooke J in Permakraft distinguished between 
future and existing creditors, when he noted that future creditors, in deciding to do business 
with the company, could be guardians of their own interests, a choice which he felt was 
clearly denied to existing creditors .. 
4 Can there be exculpation? 
It may be asked, if the duty to regard the interests of creditors is owed to the company, or 
perhaps even if it is owed to the creditors, is exculpation 
116 of the directors by shareholders of 
the company possible or effectual?
117 The issue is not without significance. Much of the 
case law purporting to evidence a common law duty to creditors involves fact patterns where 
115 
I 16 
117 
See the comments of Street CJ in Kinsela, above n 45 , p 221 , cited above at n 49. 
The term "exculpation" is used here synonymously with ratifying, authorising, forgiving or condoning a breach of 
duty, as per the commentary in Wishart, above n 36, pp 327 & 328. 
Sealy notes that apart from a formal scheme of arrangement, "There is no room in company law to allow for any 
possibility of ratification by the creditors". See Sealy-Monash, above n 91 , p 181. 
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the relevant company's shareholders had approved the director conduct before the court.
118 
The case law, however, appears equivocal. In Kinsela, the New South Wales Court of Appeal 
concluded that exculpation by the shareholders is not possible.
119 In contrast, in 
Multinational the majority of the English Court of Appeal decided that because the 
shareholders had unanimously approved the actions of the directors, the company could not 
1 , 120 comp am. 
It has been suggested that whether exculpation is possible has its roots in the notion of 
, h d 121 corporate entity oo . For wrongs to the company, the case of Foss v Harbottle
122 is 
authority that the proper plaintiff is the company. Nowadays it is considered that the majority 
of shareholders in meeting have the power to exculpate directors.
123 In this context, three 
issues are raised by the possibility of exculpation of a breach for the directors' duty to take 
into account the interests of creditors. 
First, is whether there is a ratifiable breach of the duty. It has been suggested that no 
convincing general definition of what types of breaches are ratifiable has been developed.
124
. 
The second issue is what is the significance of unanimity amongst the shareholders. Cooke J 
in Permakraft
125 noted that the unanimous agreement of shareholders in matters intra vires 
the company binds the company. The apparent importance of unanimity to the case law is 
that, if and when, directors actions have been approved by shareholders, it has been 
unanimously in each case. It is submitted, however, that unanimity is really a "red herring" 
as the effect of exculpation should not be affected by whether it is passed by majority or 
unanimously. It remains approval by one interest group only. Finally, if exculpation is 
possible is it always available or does its availability vary with the solvency of the company 
at the time of the decision? In Multinational the relevant decisions were made when the 
company was solvent and the court held the decisions were ratifiable. By contrast, in Kinsela 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
See below Part IV - An Analysis Of The Coninued Relevance Of The Common Law Duty Regarding Creditors: 
Does It Add Anything To The 93 Act? 
Kinsela, above n 45, p 732. 
Multinational, above n 80, pp 268 & 269, 282 and 288 et seq. 
Wishart, above n 36, p 327. Seealso above Part II Section b Subsection 1 - The orthodox view: exclusively to the 
company. 
See above n 121. 
See K W Wedderburn "Shareholders' Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle" ( 1957) 15 CLJ 194 and ( 1958) 16 
CLJ 93. 
Wishart, above n 36, p 328. 
Permakrafi, above n 59, pp 247-249. 
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the company was in a state of imminent collapse and the breach of duty was not ratifiable. 
This apparent conflict can be explained by an examination of the contrasting judicial 
approaches in the respective cases. It is perfectly consistent with Dillon J's eschewal of a 
duty to creditors at common law that he endorsed exculpation by shareholders in 
Multinational. Similarly, Street CJ's comments in Kinsela are consistent with the court's 
generally sympathetic approach to a duty to creditors in that case. But to suggest that the 
common law duty is ratifiable prior to the onset of insolvency, but not after, appears to 
complicate matters unduly. Conceptually, it seems odd that a duty for the benefit of one 
interest group could be exculpated by another interest group at any time, but even more so 
when the groups' interests would be directly opposed, as is the case for creditors and 
shareholders upon the insolvency of a company. Furthermore, company law is said to have a 
long record of striking down phoney or self-serving votes by shareholders which have 
purportedly ratified directors breaches of duty.
126 
5 What is the source of the duty? 
It may be suggested that the rationale for the duty to creditors conditions its form. Cooke J 
suggested tort may be an appropriate starting point, 
127 but conceptually this appears 
unconvincing. 128 It is not directors' primary role to take care but to take risks. A duty of care 
and the liberty to embrace risk are "incompatible bedfellows" .
129 Another suggested source 
has been contract, particularly in the case of salaried directors.
130 There is, however, no 
privity of contract between a company's creditors and its directors, and no relationship of trust 
in the traditional sense either. Creditors deal with a company as a matter of bargain and 
bargain involves risk. The law has traditionally looked askance at attempts in other contexts 
to infer a trust in a situation which is purely one of debt. It is therefore unlikely that either 
contract or trust could rightly be considered the basis for the duty. General consensus
131 
appears to favour equity as the source of the duty, although such an equitable duty appears 
limited to one owed to the company. Equity has the advantage of appearing to be a simple 
126 
127 
128 
129 
!JO 
Ill 
Sealy-Monash, above n 91, p 182. Such cases are usually described as fraud on the minority, or more accurately, 
fraud on the company. 
Permakraft, above n 59, p 250. 
See Sealy-Monash, above n 91, pp 176 & 177. 
Sealy-Monash, above n 91, p 176. 
Above n 129. 
See Dabner, above n 40. 
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extension of previous common law duties, and for this reason it has been suggested that 
equity appears to be the basis on which most cases were decided. 
132 Conversely, it has been 
suggested that the case law can stand as evidence of the application of statutory prohibitions, 
i.e., misfeasance being the best example. A further suggested source of the duty is the 
statutory scheme of creditor protection.
133 The duty created by Tipping J in Hilton has been 
described as a duty by statutory synthesis. However, the duty revolved around the 
maintenance of capital doctrine, now abandoned by the 93 Act.
134 What perhaps the 
conjecture surrounding the source of the duty best illustrates is ambiguity surrounding the 
duty generally. At a minimum the duty is certainly without precise delineation. 
E Concluding Remarks As To The Notion Of A Common Law Duty Upon Directors Jn 
Relation To Creditors 
In summary, this lack of precise delineation of the nature of the duty directors may owe to 
creditors and the conduct it demands is clearly problematic. Doubt as to when the duty arises 
similarly begets uncertainty as to what the duty demands. If any conclusion can be drawn, it 
is that the most important issues concerning the common law duty appear inadequately 
analysed and poorly developed by the courts. Taking a lowest common denominator 
approach and expressing the duty merely as the aggregate of those dicta carrying the greatest 
general level of support and least objection, the following general parameters may be noted. 
Beyond any real doubt, the duty appears owed to the company alone and at the very least, it 
arises in situations where the company is insolvent. It prescribes directors consider the 
interests of creditors, although it is unclear whether this involves subverting the interests of 
shareholders, much of the judicial comment endorses such an approach once insolvency is 
pending. 
As such, the duty is not one owed to creditors per se, but rather the company. It follows 
therefore that only the company could action a breach of the duty. This is unfortunate 
because, as Sealy has noted "A supposed legal duty which is not matched by a remedy is a 
132 
Ill 
134 
Wishart, above n 36, p 333. 
R I Barrett "Directors' Duties to Creditors" ( I 977) 40 MLR 226, p 229. 
Wishart, above n 36, p 333 . 
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nonsense." 135 This is not to dismiss the notion of a duty upon directors to consider the 
interests of creditors summarily, though. Section 301 of the 93 Act permits creditors to apply 
to the court for orders seeking redress for directors' breaches of duties in relation to the 
company. Thus statute may provide a lifeline for the continued relevance of the judicial 
sympathies. But this is to ignore more fundamental shortcomings. The conduct prescribed of 
directors could best be described as nebulous. No real effort has been made in any of the 
cases to outline the type of conduct expected of directors by the duty. Moreover, the practical 
difficulties directors would face in trying to reconcile competing interests are considerable. 
With respect, Lord Templeman's comment that " ... a company is not obliged to avoid all 
ventures which involve an element of risk - but it owes a duty to keep its property inviolable 
... " is truly a nonsense. Inherent to the concept of risk is the possibility of failure. The 
limited liability company as we know it today could not have evolved to its present 
conception if it had been fettered by such contradictory demands. 
135 
Scaly-Monash, above n 91, p 177. 
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III THE COMPANIES ACT 1993 AND STATUTORY BASED DIRECTORS' 
DUTIES FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS 
A The Relationship Between The 93 Act And The Common Law As To Directors' Duties 
One of the aims of the 93 Act was to make the content of directors' duties more generally 
accessible.
136 It has been said the Act is a codification of the duties previously found in the 
common law and that the duties contained therein are intended to replace any common law 
d 
. 137 
uties. Support for this interpretation was provided by removal of clause 116 of the 
Companies Bill as it was originally introduced to Parliament. 
138 Clause 116 expressly 
provided for the preservation of the existing common law on directors' duties. Its subsequent 
removal gave strength to the argument that it was Parliament's intention to extinguish those 
existing principles. It may however be premature to read the 93 Act's silence as to the status 
of the common law as its "death knell." 
For all the talk about codification, the 93 Act does not explicitly state it purports to be a 
codification. The sections headed "Directors' Duties" 
139 stipulate nothing that appears to 
limit the duties owed by directors to only those provided. The preamble to the Act is 
similarly vague, stating the 93 Act is intended "[t]o encourage efficient and responsible 
management of companies by allowing directors a wide discretion in matters of business 
judgment while at the same time providing protection for shareholders and creditors against 
the abuse of management power."
140 Nowhere is codification mentioned. Moreover, the 
broad thrust of the duties contained in the 93 Act is to create general standards.
141 It has been 
suggested, therefore, that the 93 Act will rely for its efficacy on the continuation of a 
136 
137 
IJ8 
IJ9 
140 
141 
See Law Commission Report No. 9 - Company Law Reform and Restatement, Law Commission, Wellington, 
1989, p 44, para 187. 
A Beck, Chpt 24 "Directors' Powers And Duties" in Morison's Company and Securities Law Butterworths, 
Wellington, looseleafservice ("Beck-Morison's"), p l/111 , para 24.7. 
For the text of the Bill, see CCH Special Edition - New Zealand Company Legislation, CCH (New Zealand) 
Limited, Auckland, 1993, p 88, I 02. 
93 Act, sections 131-138. 
93 Act, Preamble, paragraph (d). 
See DO Jones Company Law In New Zealand - A Guide to the Companies Act 1993, Butterworths, Wellington, 
1993, p 113, where the author notes: 
To refer to this adoption as a "codification" is not entirely appropriate because while the treatment of 
some aspects of the common law duties appears to be exhaustive (e .g. the duty to avoid conflicts), in 
large part the duties included in the statute are general standards. 
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substratum of common law.
142 Thus, although the intention of the Law Commission who 
instigated the process that culminated in the enactment of the 93 Act was to "distil the general 
principles from the cases and express them in the statute" 
143 it is far from conclusive that the 
common law has been superseded. The general nature of the statutory duties 
144 provides the 
judiciary with a wide discretion in the manner in which the duties will be applied to director 
conduct, and a fortiori, the precedent value of how similarly formulated common law duties 
were previously applied is unlikely to be readily discarded by the courts.
145 There appears 
scope indeed for the continued application of common law formulations of directors' 
d 
, 146 
uties. 
B Statutory Directors' Duties Provided In The 93 Act For The Implicit Benefit Of 
Creditors 
The 93 Act does not provide that any of the directors' duties contained therein are owed to 
creditors. Subsection 169(3) provides certain duties are owed exclusively to either the 
company or the shareholders, however.
147 The dichotomy established thereby between the 
company and its shareholders appears to support an argument that the 93 Act endorses an 
enterprise conception of the company, as opposed to the present associated members. 
Nevertheless, although no statutory directors' duties are owed explicitly to creditors, the 93 
Act undeniably contains duties which must have been intended to benefit creditors. 
Specifically, these are the duties to refrain from reckless trading
148 and to avoid obligations a 
director believes the company would be unable to perform. 
149 Both these duties are explicitly 
142 
14) 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
149 
See B Harris "Fiduciary Duties of Directors Under the Companies Act 1993" [1994] NZLJ 242, p 245 . Harris 
argues this will be particularly so regarding misuse of information, prejudice to the company from such misuse, 
and notification of the use of company information . 
See above n 136. 
For example, the duty to exercise a power for a proper purpose, provided in the 93 Act, section 133 . 
In this regard, see Anderson's Company and Securities Law Brooker & Friend, Wellington, looseleaf service 
("Andersons") , Part VIII - Directors' Duties, paras 126.01-138.04 and accompanying commentary which provides 
commentary upon the common law fiduciary duties in the context of the provi sions of the 93 Act. 
For example, 93 Act, subsection 169(3) provides "without limiting subsection(!) of this section, the duties set out 
in [sections 90, 140 and 148 of the 93 Act] are duties owed to shareholders .. . ". Subsection 169(1) provides "A 
shareholder may bring an action 11gainst a director for a breach of a duty owed to him or her as a shareholder." 
Thus, subsections 169(1) and 169(3) appear to anticipate duties other than those provided in sections 90, 140 and 
148 being owed to shareholders. There is no reason why such other duties should only be statutory based. 
See above n 146. 
93 Act, section 135. 
93 Act, section 136. 
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owed to the company as an entity.
150 The following sections discuss the likely parameters of 
the two duties, 
151 drawing largely on offences created by similar 5 5 Act provisions. 
C The Statutory Duty To Refrain From Reckless Trading 
J The 93 Act provision: section 135 
Section 135 of the 93 Act provides:
152 
A director of a company must not -
(a) Agree to the business of the company being carried on in a manner likely to create a 
substantial risk of serious loss to the company's creditors; or 
(b) Cause or allow the business of the company to be carried on in a manner likely to create a 
substantial risk of serious loss to the company's creditors. 
2 55 Act origins: paragraph 320(1)(b) 
Section 135 is very similar to paragraph 320(1)(b) of the 55 Act, 
153 which essentially 
prohibited company officers from knowingly carrying on the business of the company in a 
reckless manner. It may seem odd section 135 is headed "Reckless Trading" when there 
150 
15 1 
152 
153 
93 Act, subsection 169(3). 
The author is unaware of any decided case law upon either section at time of writing. 
93 Act, section 135 replaced a provision proposed by the Law Commission requiring directors not to risk solvency 
unreasonably. 
55 Act, section 320 provided: 
320 Responsibility for fraudulent trading of persons concerned (1) If in the course of the winding up of a 
company it appears that -
(a) Any person was , while an officer of the company, knowingly a party to the contracting of a debt by the 
company and did not, at the time the debt was contracted, honestly believe on reasonable grounds that 
the company would be able to pay the debt when it fell due for payment as well as all its other debts, 
(including future and contingent debts); or 
(b) Any person was, while an officer of the company, knowingly a party to the carrying on of any business 
of the company in a reckless manner; or 
(c) Any person was knowingly a party to the carrying on of any business of the company with intent to 
defraud creditors of the company or creditors of any other person or for any fraudulent purpose, -
the Court, on the application of the Official Assignee or the liquidator or any creditor or contributory of the 
company, may, if it thinks it proper to do so, declare that the person shall be personally responsible, without any 
limitation of liability, for all or any part of the debts and other liabilities of the company as the Court may direct. 
On the hearing of an application under this subsection the Official Assignee or the liquidator, as the case may be, 
may himself give evidence or call witnesses. 
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appears to be no mention of recklessness in the body of the section whatsoever. 
154 Perhaps 
the most important distinction to make between section 135 of the 93 Act and paragraph 
320(1)(b) of the 55 Act is that the former appears to be a duty applicable to all companies at 
any time, whilst the latter was only available once the company was being wound up. 
3 Prima facie meaning of "a substantial risk of serious loss to the company's creditors" 
The significant words in section 135 are clearly "a substantial risk of serious loss to the 
company's creditors." It is apparent this statutory test draws heavily on the antecedent case 
law under paragraph 320(1)(b). The test adopted by the courts to decide if a director had 
been reckless for the purposes of paragraph 320(1)(b) under the 55 Act was formulated by 
Bisson J in the leading case Thompson v Innes & Anor
155 as follows: 
156 
[W}as there something in the financial position of this company which would have drawn the attention 
of an ordinary prudent director to the real possibility not so slight as to be a negligible risk, that his 
continuing to carry on the business of the company would cause the kind of serious loss to creditors 
of the company which section 320(l)(b) was intended to prevent. 
Bisson J's "serious loss to creditors of the company" all but mirrors section 135's "serious loss 
to the company's creditors." Moreover, given this similarity, it is not unreasonable to suggest 
Bisson J's "real possibility not so slight as to be a negligible risk" formulation would be 
adopted by the courts as a proxy for "substantial risk". The duties appear to be objective on 
both the paragraph 320(1)(b) 55 Act formulation, due to the reference to "ordinary prudent 
director", and upon the section 135 formulation, due to the objective standard of care imposed 
on directors exercising duties under the 93 Act by section 13 7 of the 93 Act. 
157 
Notwithstanding that a director's subjective belief under section 135 would probably not 
154 
155 
156 
157 
A reference to "reckless trading" in the Companies Bill was removed before it was passed. See Beck-Morison's, 
aboven 137,p 123,para24.16, fn3. 
(1985) 2 NZCLC 99,463 ("Thompson v lnnes"). 
Above n [n-1), p 99,472 (emphasis added). 
93 Act, section 13 7 provides: 
A director of a company, when exercising powers or performing duties as a director, must exercise the care, 
diligence, and skill that a reasonable director would exercise in the same circumstances taking into account, but 
without limitation,-
(a) The nature of the company; and 
(b) The nature of the decision; and 
(c) The position of the director and the nature of the responsibilities undertaken by him or her. 
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excuse a breach of duty, where a director has acted on proper advice the director may be able 
"d 1· b"l" 158 to avo1 ia 1 1ty. 
The moment of the words "agree", "cause", or "allow" in section 135 are to redress 
interpretational problems arising under paragraph 320(1)(b) concerning the meaning of 
"knowingly". 
159 "Allow" would particularly appear to provide the courts with an opportunity 
to expansively apply section 135 to cover directors who allowed substantial risks to creditors 
to arise, but who took no active role in the decisions begetting the risk. 
4 Analysis of the elements of the paragraph 320(1)(b) "reckless trading" offence 
provided in the 55 Act 
For a creditor, liquidator, Official Assignee or contributory of the company to have an action 
under paragraph 320(1)(b) of the 55 Act, the prerequisite elements of the offence had to be 
established. The paragraph had the following elements, and the burden of proof, to the civil 
standard of the balance of probabilities, was upon the person, usually a liquidator, who 
b h h 
. 160 
roug t t e act10n: 
I. an officer of the company 
2. who was knowingly 
3. a party 
4. to the carrying on of any business of the company 
5. in a reckless manner. 
"Officer" was a defined term under the 55 Act, 
161 expressly including a director, manager or 
secretary of the company. The definition was not exhaustive, however, and any person 
holding a position in the company could be included.
162 Directors were obviously invariably 
considered officers. 
158 
159 
160 
161 
162 
93 Act, section 138. 
For example, the director who did not personally take part in the business of the company, but was content to let 
other directors incur debts while the company was insolvent. 
See above n 153. 
55 Act, subsection 2(1). 
See A Beck and A Borrowdale Guidebook to New Zealand Companies & Securities Law, 4th ed, Commerce 
Clearing House New Zealand Limited, Auckland, 1990 ("Beck & Borrowdale- 4th ed"), p 43, para 302. 
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To take the third element out of order, for a person to be a "party" that person "must take 
some positive and active part in the actual conduct of the business operations of the 
company."
163 
This formulation of "party", although English in origin, was expressly 
endorsed in New Zealand in the context of paragraph 320(1)(b).
164 It has been said being a 
party "necessitates some form of positive involvement, not mere inertia" 
165 and "what is 
implicit in the court's finding is that being 'a party to' necessitates positive action with regard 
to the acts tainted ... but does not include mere participation in the general conduct of the 
. ., 166 
busmess. 
To be "knowingly" a party in the context of paragraph 320(1)(b), it has been said:
167 
The word knowingly probably does not require an element of mens rea but is likely to protect officers 
who have not taken an active part in the management and have no knowledge of the affairs of the 
company - See Re J Hurdley and Son Ltd (in liq) ... 
168 
In Hurdley, Ostler and Fair JJ held that parliament's object in using "knowingly" was to 
protect such members of the company as do not take an active part in its management, and 
therefore, have no knowledge of the state of its finances. Ostler J said: 
169 
16) 
164 
165 
166 
167 
168 
169 
if a reasonable man at the time that the debt was incurred and with the knowledge of the directors as 
to affairs of the company would have known that the company was insolvent, and that there was no 
reasonable chance of its being able to pay the debt incurred together with all its other debts, then, in 
my opinion the directors are liable ... 
See In Re Maidstone Buildings Provisions Ltd [1977] I WLR 1085, cited in Anderson's above n 145, Companies 
Act 1955 Commentary, p 1-580, para Cos 320.07. 
In Thompson v Innes, above n 155, Bisson J held, at p 99,470: 
For a person to be a party to the carrying on of a business he must take some positive and active part in 
the actual conduct of the business operations of the company (see In Re Maidstone Buildings Provisions 
Ltd [1977] I WLR I 085). Such positive and active part may take various forms and would include the 
giving of advice. 
See Farrar, above n 8, p 22. 
See G Walker "Directors' Liability For Fraudulent Trading" [1984) 11 NZULR 189, p 197. 
P Howell and M Whale Recent Developments In Insolvency Law and Practice, NZLS Seminar Paper, 1987, p 30. 
[ 1941] NZLR 686 (" Hurdley"). 
Hurdley, above n 168, p 743. 
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Myers CJ held that "knowingly" did not import mens rea but meant that, before an order can 
be made, it must be shown that the shareholder of the company sought to be mulcted knew 
that the particular debts were being incurred and that the shareholder also had a knowledge 
generally of the company's affairs, so that, as a reasonable person, he or she should have 
known that, at the time when the particular debts were contracted, the company could not 
have had any reasonable or justifiable expectations of being able to pay the same as well as 
its other debts. 
170 On the basis on Hurdley therefore, it appeared that in order for an officer to 
be "knowingly a party" he or she had to have actual knowledge of the reckless trading and a 
general knowledge of the company's affairs. Further, the officer must also have taken an 
active part in the prohibited act (i.e., the reckless trading) and a mere omission will not make 
the officer liable. 
The meaning of "any business of the company" was discussed by the Court of Appeal in Re 
Nimbus Trawling Company Ltd: Keegan and Anor v Page Vivian Motors Ltd.
171 In the case, 
the court held by a majority' 
72 that in section 320 the expression "any business of the 
company" included an isolated transaction even when the transaction was not in the course of 
carrying on the company's usual business. Thus, section 320 was applicable to the process of 
carrying out by the company of any transaction which was a business transaction. The 
majority emphasised that section 320 used "any business" as opposed to "the business", 
indicating that, in their Honours' opinions, the section did not refer to the totality of the 
company's activities. Thus, it was sufficient to impose liability, if in the course of business 
generally, a particular piece of business was carried out with requisite intent. 
173 
Recklessness was undoubtedly the most important element of paragraph 320(1)(b). The 
leading New Zealand case on the topic was Thompson v Innes. The appropriate test has 
170 
17 1 
172 
17] 
Hurdley, above n 168, p 734. 
( 1986) 3 NZCLC 99,646 ("Nimbus"). 
Cooke P and Somers J, Richardson J dissenting. 
While on the facts of Nimbus, above n , the sale of an asset and the disbursement of its proceeds was not the 
company's business in the normal commercial sense of trading for the purpose of making a profit, it was held that 
where the company had ceased trading and engaged in winding up the business was still being carried on by it. 
Cooke P, at I 00, 165, stated: 
.. . the provision [paragraph 320(/)(b)J covers any dealing or transaction of the company performed, 
carried out, or conducted with the intention of defrauding creditors ... Remedial legislation of this kind 
should not be narrowly interpreted. 
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already been noted in this paper.
174 However, there are additional aspects to recklessness that 
should be noted. First, merely because a company was unable to pay its debts as they fell due 
does not of itself prove recklessness in the carrying on of the company.
175 In Thompson v 
Innes, it was noted that many companies experience liquidity problems, but with some 
forbearance by the creditors they may trade their way out of difficulty. Bisson J, however, 
continued "there are grave responsibilities on directors who take that course as without 
reasonable prospects of success, their actions may amount to a reckless disregard for the 
losses they impose on company creditors." 
176 Secondly, in determining recklessness it was 
necessary to enquire if the conduct was blameworthy .
177 This was an objective test.
178 Thus, 
the courts were not required to look at the mental state of the particular officer. 
Blameworthiness to the extent of dishonesty did not have to be proven, however.
179 Finally, 
the standard imposed by the courts was that of the reasonably competent person in the 
position of the defendant. 
180 It is now appropriate to examine how the courts applied the 5 5 
Act provision. 
Application by the courts of the reckless trading offence: The leading cases under paragraph 
320(1)(b) 
a Thompson v Innes 
In Thompson v Jnnes
181 the company was incorporated in August 1981. Mr and Mrs I were 
its only directors and shareholder, Mr I working as the principal salesman and Mrs I in the 
office. By November 1983 the company had gone into voluntary winding up and a liquidator 
appointed. After its first full year's trading ending March 1983, the company recorded a gross 
profit of$48,733, but after deducting operating expenses a loss of $1,209 resulted. Accounts 
from March 1983 to the date of liquidation showed a gross profit of $15,669, but after 
174 
175 
176 
177 
178 
179 
180 
181 
See above Part Ill Section C Subsection 3 - Prima facie meaning of "a substantial risk of serious loss to the 
company's creditors" and text accompanying above n 156. 
Thompson v Innes, above n 155, p 99,468. 
Above n 175. 
Thompson v Innes, above n 155, p 99,470. 
In contrast, to paragraph 320(1)(a) of the 55 Act, where an honest belief was relevant, for example. 
Thompson v Innes, above n 155, p 99,472. 
See Re Electronics Business Systems Ltd (in liq); Guzzwe /1 v Burr (1990) 5 NZCLC 66,473 ("Electronics") , 
p 66,477. 
See above n 180. 
WG953 I l 0.242 
-35-
deducting operating expenses a loss of $32,253. The later profits were produced on an 
increased turnover, so that the gross profit margin actually fell from 31 % of sales to 13%, 
whilst sales had increased by $1,300 per month on average. Similarly, the liquidity ratio had 
deteriorated, so that by November 1983 current assets were $38,442 and current liabilities 
$66,293.
182 The liquidator applied for an order under section 320 of the 55 Act declaring the 
directors personally liable for the debts and liabilities of the company to the extent of 
$50,700. 
In June 1983 Mr and Mrs I met with their bank and F, an accountant and the company's 
secretary. Estimates of performance to June 1984 were sales of $287,000 and a cash surplus 
of $12,112. As a result the bank increased its overdraft accommodation to $12,000. Bisson J 
considered the meeting indicated "a desire with further bank accommodation to trade out of a 
loss situation and liquidity problems. It could not be said that the directors who had the 
support of their company accountant were then carrying on the business of the company in an 
unreasonable manner. I do not regard the bank's small increase to its overdraft facility as 
significant as the bank was secured to for any advances made to the company under its 
mortgage over the house property." 1
83 F, in evidence, was satisfied with the performance 
estimates for the company, given his knowledge of Mr I as a salesman and said he believed 
that as at June 1983 the company could have traded its way out of financial difficulties. 
184 
However, the company never met its sales forecasts in the months after June 1983, and 
further, purchased an additional vehicle and acquired computer equipment as well as making 
substantial cash drawings, all against F's advice. 
Bisson J found that Mr and Mrs I were intimately involved in the day to day running of the 
company, both being full aware of its financial position. In contrast, F, played no part in the 
day to day conduct of the company's business nor did he encourage the directors to carry it on 
once presented with financial difficulties. As such, only Mr and Mrs I were responsible for 
carrying on the company's business. 
185 The issues was whether their management had been 
182 
183 
184 
185 
For the facts of Thompson v Innes generally, see above n, pp 99,464-99,420. 
Thompson v Innes, above n 155, p 99,487 
Thompson v Innes , above n 155, p 99,469. 
Thompson v Innes, above n 155, p 99,470. 
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reckless. 1
86 Bisson J then proceeded to examine the meaning of recklessness for the purposes 
187 
of paragraph 320(1)(b). 
In applying the test to the facts, both Mr and Mrs I were held by the court to be knowingly 
parties to the carrying on of the business in a reckless manner from the end of September 
1983. 188 The crucial evidence was that the sales figures for July, August and September were 
only 60% of the budgeted forecasts, whilst creditors had nearly doubled. His Honour held the 
company had clearly been insolvent and unable to pay its debts as they fell due for some 
months. Although Bisson J accepted that when Mr and Mrs I saw the bank in June 1983 they 
had reason to believe they could trade their way out of their financial difficulties, the: 
189 
... situation was nonetheless serious and called for very close monitoring in the light of the budget they 
had prepared. The rate of decline of the company's trading position was so rapid that by the end of 
September it should have forthwith ceased trading. The directors must have, or should have, as 
ordinary prudent directors realised that to continue the business operations of the company any further 
would cause a serious loss to creditors. No steps were taken to prune expenditure. 
190 
As to the issue of the award, Bisson J declared the directors responsible for $25,000 of the 
company's debts "having regard to the increase in creditors, the siphoning off of stocks the 
making of cash drawings and relieving themselves of a personal guarantee to the bank". He 
gave no guide as to how the factors related to his award, but on the facts it amounted to 
approximately half the sum claimed by the liquidators. Significantly, His Honour said the 
directors were to be jointly and severally responsible. 
186 
187 
188 
189 
190 
Above n 185. 
His comments have been dealt with elsewhere in this paper, see above Part Ill Section C Subsection 4 - Ana
lysis 
of the elements of the paragraph 320( I )(b) offence provided in the 55 Act. 
Thompson v Innes , above n 155, p 99,472. 
Above n 188. 
Bisson J was further critical of directors' bechaviour of incuring unnecessary expense (the computer and mo
tor 
vehicle), and personal drawings, and when money was received it was used to clear the bank overdraft w
hich 
personally benefited the directors by di scharing their personal guarantees. However, he did not conside
r this 
amounted to dishonestly. Thompson v Innes, above n 155, p 99,472. 
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b the Rex Wood decision 
In re Rex Wood Service Centre Limited (in liq),
191 the company, which had been incorporated 
in 1978, suffered an unexplained loss of assets between April and May 1981 in the sum of 
approximately $324,000. In 1983 the company was wound up and a liquidator appointed. 
The liquidator applied to the court for orders pursuant to section 319, 3 20( 1 )(b) and 3 20( 1 )( c) 
of the 55 Act, declaring the company's director, W, personally responsible for an amount 
equivalent to the total of proved creditors in the liquidation, plus interest. Section 319 of the 
55 Act imposed liability upon directors for failure to keep proper accounting records.
192 The 
liquidator alleged in support of the section 319 claim that bank statements, customer 
accounts, debtors lists, deposit books, stock lists, invoices and records of goods sold were not 
kept. 193 On the facts, there were no records to establish how the company had lost the funds 
in question between April and May 1981. It was held by Doogue J that proper accounting 
records would have explained the substantial loss suffered by the company. 
194 As W was 
responsible for the lack of records "for that information not to be available, the [director] has 
acted in such a reckless manner that it is proper and appropriate that an order also be made 
under section 320(1)(b)."
195 Doogue J saw fit to make an order that W was personally liable 
for the whole sum owing to creditors in the liquidation, plus interest. 
191 
192 
193 
194 
195 
( 1987) 3NZCLC I 00, 199 ("Rex Wood'') 
55 Act, subsection 319(1) provided : 
319(1) Personal resposibility Subject to subsection (2) of this section, if-
(a) A company that is being wound up and that is unable to pay its debts has failed to
 comply with section 
151 of this Act (which relates to the keeping of accounting records) : and 
(b) The Court considers that-
(i) The failure to so comply has contributed to the company's inability to pay all its d
ebts or has 
resulted in substantial uncertainty as to the assets and liabilities of the company or has
 
substantially impeded the orderly winding up thereof; or 
(ii) For any other reason it is proper to make a declaration under this section-
the Court, on the application of the Official Assignee or the liquidator or any creditor or cont
ributory of 
the company may, if it thinks it proper to do so, declare that any one or more of the offic
ers of the 
company shall be personally responsible, without any limitation of liability, for all or any 
part of the 
debts and other liabilities of the company as the Court may direct. 
All of which had to be kept pursuant to section 151 of 55 Act. 
Rex Wood, above n 191 , p I 00, 207, where Doogue J felt: 
the particular matter which weighs with me is that the failure of the company to have records, 
records 
which, on the evidence, should have been in the possession of [the director} to explain the defic
iency in 
the company's position between I April I 98 I and I I May I 98 I . The reduction in the co
mpany's 
assets ... is something which should be disclosed by any proper company records .. 
Rex Wood, above n 191 , p 100,207 
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C Lake Tekapo
196 
The success of the actions in Thompson v Innes and Rex Wood contrasts with an unsuccessful 
action by the liquidators in Lake Tekapo. In Lake Tekapo actions were brought against the 
director of the company, W, who was also the owner of all but one share in the company, 
under paragraphs 320(1)(b) and 320(1)(c) of the 55 Act, to recover the sum of two capital 
dividends W had caused to be declared. The background to the case was that the litigation 
was another episode in a sequence of suits which had taken place between W and other 
family members, W's parents and his sister, R, over a number of years. In June 1983 a formal 
deed of settlement was entered into between W, the company, Alpine (another family 
company owned by W and his sister), R, and W's parents. An essential point established by 
the deed was that Alpine would pay the company a sum, representing goodwill upon the 
transfer of the company's business to Alpine, and that sum would become the source of the 
proposed capital dividend to be declared by the company in W's favour.
197 The first capital 
dividend was paid in March 1984 in the sum of $152,768. In examining the allegations 
pursuant to paragraph 320(1)(c), Tipping J commenced by investigating the financial position 
of the company when the first dividend was paid. On the facts, he was not satisfied the 
liquidators demonstrated, on the balance of probabilities, that the company was insolvent.
198 
In addressing whether the dividend could have been paid in a reckless manner, after 
examining the meaning of reckless for the purposes of paragraph 3 20(1 )(b ), 
199 as the 
company was solvent at the relevant time, Tipping J held W's actions in paying the dividend 
could not have been held to have been reckless. In his words he did "not think there was 
anything in the financial position of the company at that time which would have drawn the 
attention of Mr White as an ordinary prudent director to the possibility that his declaration of 
this dividend would cause serious loss to creditors or indeed any loss at that time to 
creditors. 11200 However, the position was not so straight forward regarding the second 
dividend. The liquidators alleged that W had been reckless in ignoring the contingency on an 
196 
197 
198 
199 
200 
Re Lake Tekapo Motor Inn Limited {in liq) ( 1987) 3NZCLC I 00, 156 ("Lake Tekapo"). 
The structure was essentially tax driven, as the capital dividend would have been tax free in W's hands, rather than 
press for a salary payment form the company which would have been taxable. Tipping J conside
red " ... the first 
capital dividend ultimately paid was in part in lieu of salary which would otherwise have 
been claimed by Mr 
White.", Lake Tekapo, above n 196, p 100, 161. 
Lake Tekapo, above n 196, p I 00, 167. He found "on a realistic appraisal of its debts incurred an
d contingent [the 
company] had a surplus of assets over liabilities of$17,000", above n 196, p 100, 166. 
Lake Tekapo, above n 196, pp I 00, 171-100, 172. 
Lake Tekapo, above n 196, p I 00, 172. 
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adverse judgment against the company from litigation with Alpine, and further that W had 
preferred himself to other creditors of the company.
201 Tipping J rightly pointed out W was 
not a creditor of the company in relation to the capital dividend, but noted the essence of the 
liquidators submission was that W had looked after his own interests with no regard for the 
creditors of the company, and was thus arguably reckless. At the time of the second dividend 
in September 1984 the company was, on the facts, insolvent.
202 But on the evidence Tipping 
J was not convinced it had been established the second dividend was made in reckless 
disregard of the Alpine claim or the position of creditors generally.
203 His Honour was 
satisfied W was truthful when he indicated that in declaring the second dividend all he was 
doing was implementing the arrangement set out in the deed of settlement with his family. 
Tipping J looked to the substance of the dividend noting the funds distributed were value 
from two properties that were sold and which the deed had provided were to become W's 
204 
personal property. 
The final aspect of the case was the argument that if W had been liable, he could have relied 
on section 468 of the 55 Act. Tipping J noted the section only applied if the court was 
satisfied the director had acted honestly or reasonably, and noted "in cases where a person has 
been found to have acted recklessly it would seem to me to be unlikely that he could also be 
20-
found to have acted reasonably." ) 
d the Electronics case 
In Electronics,
206 W who became a director of the company in early 1982, had overvalued 
stock figures for the company and understated its trade creditors. The liquidator of the 
company bought an action against Wunder sections 319,320 and 321 of the 55 Act alleging 
that Wand another director B (who settled with the liquidator out of court) had failed to keep 
20) 
202 
203 
204 
205 
206 
Above, n 200. 
Lake Tekapo, above n 196, p I 00, 170. 
Lake Tekapo, above n 196, p 100, 173. 
Lake Tekapo, above n 196, p I 00, 173 per Tipping J: 
... the second dividend was in substance a payment reflecting part of jimds derived from th
e [two 
properties'} sale.and thus validly in Mr White's mind simply a further step in getting their value i
nto his 
own hands as had been implicit in the settlement negotiation and its terms. 
Lake Tekapo, above n 196, p 100, 174. 
See above n 205 . 
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property accounting records and had carried on the business of the company in a reckless 
manner. 
More particularly, the background facts to the case are as follows. In August 1981 the 
company's business showed a loss of $69,828.
207 The company's accountant prepared 
financial forecasts in September 1981 showing sales of $45,000 per month would be 
necessary to break even. During the next four months that volume was not achieved and the 
company operated at a loss of $23,961 to the end of December 1981. The company 
continued to trade during 1982 and B prepared a set of accounts that showed a net profit of 
$46,876 for the six months to June 1982. A further set of account for the nine months to 
September 1982 showed a loss of over $10,000. This caused B to have an independent check 
made on the stock figures. The check showed stock had been considerably overvalued and 
trade creditors understated, in the June 1982 accounts. As a result of the check it was shown 
the company's liabilities exceeded its assets by approximately $183,000. The company then 
went into voluntary winding up and a liquidator was eventually appointed.
208 
Evidence disclosed that although B had assumed responsibility for the day to day financial 
affairs of the company, in relation to the stock figures, B was dependent upon information 
supplied to him by W, who personally attended to the company's stock takes. W was found 
to have been well aware of the significance of stock valuation for profitability. Ongley J held 
that W's stocktaking was not in accordance with the standard expected of a reasonably 
competent retail manager, and that W "knew or should have known that the system of 
stocktaking developed by him would result in a false position as to profitability of trading the 
company's asset position as shown in its accounts. "
209 From the beginning of 1982 W should 
have been aware that the company was trading at a loss and that to continue trading would 
involve the company's creditors in the risk of financial loss. Thus, Ongley J found W 
207 
208 
209 
The company had been trading its business as agent for a partnership which was dissolved following the August 
198 I loss, as the loss all but extinguished the partnership capital. The business was transferred to the company in 
September 1981 . The balance sheet for the company when it started trading as principal had zero equity, its assets 
and liabilities each totalling $337,550. See Electronics, above n 180, pp 66,475 - 66,476. 
For the facts of Electronics see above n 180, pp 66,474 - 66,477. 
Electronics, above n 180, p 66,477. 
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knowingly was a party to the carrying on of the business of the company in a reckless manner 
210 
from 1982 onwards. 
The final aspect was the amount of the declaration. Ongley J noted that what part of 
company's liabilities that could be attributed to W's recklessness depended in part as to when 
the company should reasonably have been wound up. On the fact, His Honour thought the 
end of 1981 was the very latest this should have occurred. At that stage, the trading losses of 
the company were $23 ,961, so Ongley J reasoned the loss attributable to the reckless trading 
was the final deficiency upon liquidation owing to creditors of $169,629 less $23,961.00, or 
$145,668.
211 
6 Suggested parameters of the 93 Act's section 135 duty regarding reckless trading 
Due to the close similarity between section 135 of the 93 Act and paragraph 320(1)(b) of the 
55 Act, it is submitted the case law decided pursuant to the former provision will continue to 
be utilised by the courts in determining cases under the new provision. As noted, the most 
apparent difference between the two provisions is when each would operate. Paragraph 
320(l)(b) clearly only operated upon winding up, although its retrospective application had 
the effect of impugning conduct prior to winding up. By contrast, there is no such limitation 
upon the operation of section 135. It is suggested this difference will not be of great 
significance. Obligations to creditors, be they expressed in terms of a duty or otherwise, only 
become meaningful in times of financial hardship. In times of profitability, when creditors 
are being paid in the normal course there is no need or incentive for a creditor to seek redress 
from the debtor company's directors: there is no prejudice to them. 
A further divergence between the provisions is the requisite degree of knowledge a director 
require before liability would be imposed. Under the 55 Act, the requirement that an officer 
be "knowingly a party" to the misconduct meant, on the authority of the Hurdley case, that 
the director had to have, first, actual knowledge of the reckless trading, and secondly, a 
210 
21 I 
Procedurally, Ongley J was of the view that the case under section 319 of fialing to comply with section 151 of 
the 55 Act should be subsumed in the allegations of carying on the business of the company in a reckless manner 
in contravention of paragraph 320( I )(b ). Electronics, above n I 80, p 88,977. 
As B had settled out of court for $59,876.32, and Ongley J assumed, without knowing, that figure was a fair 
estimate of B's responsibility, W was orded to pay the liquidator $85,792.60. 
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general knowledge of the company's affairs. Section 135 uses the terms "agree", "cause" and 
"allow", by contrast. In particular, "allow" would appear to provide the courts with an 
opportunity to impugn directors who, through lack of enquiry, were unaware of the actual 
reckless trading but stood by as it occurred. For example, the company secretary in 
Thompson v Innes may be liable under section 135 because he allowed the company to trade 
recklessly, notwithstanding he played no part in the day to day running of the company's 
affairs and did not encourage the company to trade on once it entered financial difficulties, 
whereas in the case he escaped liability under paragraph 320(1 )(b ). 
The next issue is the significance of the terminology "the business of the company" used in 
section 135 as opposed to "any business of the company" used in paragraph 320(1)(b). Under 
the latter formulation, the Court of Appeal in Nimbus stipulated it included isolated 
transactions outside the company's usual course of business. The court's reasoning 
specifically focused on the importance of the use of "any". In doing so, the court suggested 
use of "the" has connotations of the totality of a company's business. The effect of this 
difference is arguably to exclude one-off transactions. On balance, it is submitted the courts 
would be unlikely to adopt such an interpretation, for much the same reasons as the Court of 
Appeal included isolated transactions under the 55 Act: namely, the remedial nature of the 
provision. As Cooke P noted in relation to paragraph 320(1 )(b) "Remedial legislation of this 
kind should not be narrowly interpreted".
212 
Finally, what is meant by "substantial risk of serious loss to the company's creditors"? From 
Bisson J's test in Thompson v Innes, it is submitted "substantial" would be ascribed the "real 
possibility not so slight as to be a negligible risk" formulation therefrom. But what will this 
mean in practice? If the cases decided under paragraph 320(1)(b) of the 55 Act are indeed 
used as precedents for section 135, as it is suggested they should be, then certain proscribed 
conduct can be identified. The plainest circumstances where directors will be in danger of 
breaching section 135 are akin to those in Thompson v Innes where the company traded on 
after it failed to meet break-even sales performance targets. From the same case, a failure to 
closely monitor the financial performance of a company when it is barely solvent may also 
contravene the new provision. Bisson J suggested weekly meetings of directors in such 
212 
Nimbus , above n 171 , p 100,165. 
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circumstances would be appropriate. It is submitted directors would be unwise to ignore this 
dictum. In a like vein, a failure to keep adequate financial accounts will, on the basis of Rex 
Wood, be a breach constituting reckless trading. Similar conduct likely to impugn the new 
section would also include employing misleading or inappropriate accounting procedures, as 
happened in the Electronics case. Lastly, it is submitted the precedent value of the Lake 
Tekapo decision must be limited by the demise of the capital maintenance doctrine in the 93 
Act, and the protection now afforded to distributions by the solvency test. Much more 
apparent breaches of the 93 Act
213 will occur where companies declare dividends whilst 
unable to comply with the solvency test. 
D The Duty To Avoid Imperformable Obligations 
1 Section 13 6 
The 93 Act, section 136 provides: 
A director of a company must not agree to the company incurring an obligation unless the director 
believes at the time on reasonable grounds that the company will be able to perform the obligation 
when it is required to so. 
2 The prototype 55 Act offence and its apparent differences to section I 36 
Prima facie, section 136 of the 93 Act has more than a passing resemblance to paragraph 
320(1)(a) of the 55 Act which placed civil liability upon company officers for unreasonably 
incurring debts.214
 However, section 136 appears to differ in three basic respects. First, 
section 136 relates to the incurring of an obligation. This is wider than the equivalent 
wording under paragraph 320(1)(a) of the 55 Act which related to the contracting of debts. 
The former phrase would include, for example, the provision of goods and services.
215 
Secondly, section 136 only requires a belief the particular obligation will be able to be 
performed when required. By contrast, the former paragraph 320(1 )(a) required a belief the 
213 
214 
215 
For example, 93 Act, section 56 "Recovery of Distributions" would impugn dividends declared in circumstan
ces 
where the company could not comply with the solvecy test. 
See above n 153. 
See Anderson's, above n , p 1-171 , para 136.04. 
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particular debt, at the time it was contracted, was capable of payment together with all other 
debts (including future and contingent debts). Finally, the scope of section 136 is broader, 
applying to a director at any time, unlike paragraph 320(1)(a) which only became applicable 
to directors upon the winding up of the company.
216 
3 The elements of the paragraph 320(1)(a) offences: unreasonably incurring a debt 
Paragraph 320(1 )(b )21 7 could be broken down into the following elements: 
1. an officer of the company 
2. who was knowingly 
3. a party 
4. to the contracting of a debt by the company 
5. and did not, at the time the debt was contracted honestly believe on reasonable gr
ounds 
that the company would be able to pay the debt when it fell due for payment as well as all 
its other debts (including future and contingent debts). 
The comments made upon the first three elements of officer, knowingly and a party, in 
relation to the paragraph 320(1)(b) offence,
218 are equally applicable to paragraph 320(l)(a). 
For example, in the context of the latter offence, to be "knowingly a party" to contracting a 
debt, the officer of the company must have actual knowledge of the incurring of the particular 
debt and also a general knowledge of the company's affairs. 
If the liquidator could prove the first three elements, to make an officer liable, the liquidator 
then had to prove the absence of an honest belief on reasonable grounds that the company 
would be able to pay the debt when it fell due for payment, as well as all its other debts 
existing as at when the debt in question was incurred.
219 This element could be satisfied by 
the liquidator either, first, establishing the absence of an honest belief on the facts, or 
secondly and alternatively, by showing that although such a belief was present, it was not 
216 
217 
218 
219 
See above n 153 . 
See above n 153 . 
See above Part III Section C Subsection 4 - Analysis of the elements of the paragraph 320( I )(
b) reckless trading 
offence provided in the 55 Act. 
See Re Petherick Fashions Ltd (1986) 2 BCR 177; (1987) 2 NZCLC 99,946 ("Petherick") , per E
ichelbaum J. 
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based on reasonable grounds. Reasonable grounds was assessed relative to the stand
ard of a 
reasonably competent officer of the company in that position.
220 
Thus, there was both subjective and objective elements to the test under paragraph 3
20(1)(a). 
The subjective element was whether the officer of the company had the honestly hel
d belief. 
The objective element was that, if the officer did, was it reasonable in the circumsta
nces for 
the officer to hold the belief. 
This composite test of paragraph 320(1)(a) appears reproduced in section 136. Aga
in there 
must be the subjective belief that the company could perform the obligation when cal
led upon 
to do so, fettered by the objective requirement of reasonableness. Factors which c
ould be 
evidence of reasonableness would presumably include management accounts and prof
essional 
advice confirming the company's viability.
221 
4 Prominent paragraph 320(1)(a) cases: judicial application of the unreaso
nably 
incurring a debt offence 
a the Petherick case 
One of the leading decisions under paragraph 320(1)(a) is Petherick.
222 The company was 
incorporated in April 1980 to take over the business of a clothing shop. P became 
the sole 
director and owner of 99.95% of the company's shares in April 1981. The accounts to
 the end 
of March 1981 showed the company to be in financial difficulty, having made losses
 for nine 
months, but improvement for the next three. Petherick injected more capital and sa
les rose 
for a while, but then fell away. By June 1982 the company was in deep trouble 
and had 
adopted the practice of writing cheques to pay trade creditors and holding them un
til funds 
were available to meet them. A letter was sent to creditors explaining that there ha
d been a 
downturn in sales but that the situation was temporary. The company also attempte
d to cut 
expenses and restrict its purchases of trading stock. However, sales continued to 
fall, and 
220 
221 
222 
Petherick, above n 219. The case is authority that if the belief could be said to be
 a fanciful hope, it was not 
reasonable. 
93 Act, section 138 provides a director when performing duties as a director can r
ely on prepared reports or other 
professional advice. 
See above n 221 . 
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· 223 d h after section 218 notices were serve , t e company was ordered to be wound up in 
December 1982. The liquidator applied for orders pursuant to sections 320 (paragraphs 
320(l)(a), (b) and (c)), 321 and 364 of the 55 Act. In total there were nine claims made by 
the liquidator against P totalling $123,119, of which the largest was unaccounted for trading 
stock or sales of $85,000.
224 
In introducing his discussion of subsection 320(1) generally, Eichelbaum J noted the 
subsection provided the court with jurisdiction to lift the shield of limited liability provided 
the various elements of either one of its three paragraphs could be made out.
225 The first 
element the liquidator had to establish was whether P was knowingly a party to the 
contracting of a debt by the company. On the facts, it did not present a problem, 
notwithstanding that a manageress had the day to day running of the shop, as Eichelbaum J 
was satisfied that at all relevant times P was in overall control and that any ordinary orders 
for stock were made with his knowledge and authority.
226 The liquidator then had to prove 
absence of the requisite honest belief.
227 From a conceptual point, Eichelbaum J analysed 
liability under both paragraphs 320(1)(a) and 320(1)(b) simultaneously in his judgment,
228 
(although this commentary only focuses upon his findings in relation to the former). 
By some date around the middle of 1982, Eichelbaum J said he was convinced the position 
had been reached where any further liabilities incurred were undertaken on the basis that P 
did not honestly believe on reasonable grounds that such a debt could be met when it fell due, 
together with all the other debts of the company, both the honest belief and the reasonable 
grounds being absent. Significantly, His Honour noted there were two difficulties facing a 
liquidator, wanting to base a specific recovery.
229 They were, first, the time at which all the 
elements were present, and secondly, the amount recoverable. 
223 
224 
225 
226 
227 
228 
229 
Under the 55 Act, a section 218 notice was the equivalent of the statutory demand contained in section 289 of the 
93 Act. 
Petherick, above n 219, pp 178-189; 99,947-99,956. 
Eichelbaum J also saw fit to endorse the comments of Bisson J in Thompson v Innes that the three paragraphs of 
subsection 320( 1) provided a gradation of conduct sufficiently blameworthy to pierce the shield of limited liability 
and to render a director personally liable for all or any part of the debts and other liabilities of the company. 
Petherick, above n 219, p 190; 99,957. 
Petherick, above n 219, p 191 ; 99,958. No argument was made to the contrary. 
See above Part Ill Section B Subsection 3 The elements of the paragraph 320( I )(a) offence: unreasonably 
incurring a debt. 
Petherick, above n 219, pp 191-193; 99,958-99,960. 
Petherick, above n 219, p 192; 99,959. 
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With regard to the first, the onus of proof was with the liquidator on the balance of 
probabilities.
230 On the facts, there was evidence to show April and May 1982 sales ran at 
considerably higher levels than those previously, or subsequently too. For the company to 
get out of difficulty, those levels would have had to have been not just maintained, but 
improved upon. However, having specific regard to the balance of proof, Eichelbaum J said 
he could not feel confident that it could be said P knew the company would be unable to pay 
its debts when due, or that there was an absence of reasonable grounds. His Honour 
particularly, rejected an argument of the liquidator that after the company's accountant had 
prepared draft accounts as at 31 December 1980, after nine months' trading, which revealed 
an unsatisfactory position,
231 thereafter all the company's activities infringed paragraph 
320(1)(a). The earliest piece of evidence that could establish grounds was the cheque writing 
procedure from 20 June 1982.
232 Thus, P was liable on and after that date. 
The second problem facing the liquidator was the amount recoverable. Eichelbaum endorsed 
the following general principles. 
233 First, the amount of the declaration is in the discretion of 
the court and should be in respect of a specific sum. Secondly, the amount ordered to be paid 
would generally be limited to the amount of the debts of the creditors proved to have been 
defrauded by the acts of the director. Thirdly, the money recovered by the liquidator under 
the court's order forms part of the assets of the company, available for all creditors in the 
winding up.234 Further, he added, "the order should relate and be limited to those debts 
incurred in the absence of honest belief, on reasonable grounds, that the company would be 
able to pay them as they fell due. "
235 In exercising the discretion of the court, Eichelbaum J 
considered three factors were relevant:
236 causation, culpability and duration.
237 Regarding 
causation, generally the quantum of any declaration would be limited to the amounts of those 
debts the defendant director had knowingly been a party to the contracting of, in the absence 
230 
231 
232 
233 
234 
235 
236 
237 
Above n 229. 
Over the nine months, the company had lost $6,214, and stock, at under $26,000, was less than trade debts. 
Petherick, above n 2 I 9, p 178; 99,947. 
In Petherick, above n 219, p 192; 99,959, Eichelbaum J commented: 
The state of affairs which forced that expedient and which must have been apparent to Mr Petherick 
clearly demonstrated the absence of reasonable grounds for a belief that the company could pay its 
debts as they fell due, however elastic a meaning that last expression was given. 
The principles were initially formulated by Bisson J in Re Casual Capers Ltd [ I 987) I BCR 423. 
Petherick, above n 219, p 192; 99,960. 
Above n 234. 
Endorsing the comments of Tompkins Jin Maloc Construction Ltd v Chadwick & Ors M 13/83 , New Plymouth, 
11 June 1986; ( 1986) 2 BCR, a case concerning section 3 19 of the 55 Act. 
Petherick, above n 219, pp 193-194; 99,960-99,961. 
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of the requisite honest belief.
238 As to culpability, the court could have regard to the 
culpability of the officer for the failure to comply with the law, i.e., to the extent to which the 
failure was caused by the actions or inactions of the officer. Eichelbaum J, however, thought 
that element was of little relevance on the facts of Petherick, given that only P could have 
been responsible for the outcome. He noted it would be of relevance where there was more 
than one director possibly culpable for the failure.
239 Finally, duration was said to coincide 
1 · h · h .:: 240 large y wit causat10n on t e 1acts. 
However, the real problem with assessmg the amount recoverable was not so much 
conceptual (the foregoing concepts are relatively obvious) but evidentiary.
241 The crux of His 
Honour's enquiry regarding the appropriate award was: "in essence then I am concerned to 
establish debts incurred in the period 20 June to 22 August [1982, when the section 218 
notice was served]. "
242 Average purchases by the company from 1 April to 8 December 1982 
were $21,000 per month, but the earlier months of that period were much higher on the facts. 
With regard to the problematic state of the evidence, and bearing in mind a need to err on the 
side of caution, Eichelbaum fixed the quantum of liability at $15,000.
243 Finally, although it 
was noted that it was possible to award punitive damages under paragraph 320(1)(a), the facts 
of the case did not merit it.
244 
238 
239 
240 
241 
242 
243 
244 
Eichelbaum J referred favourably to the following comment from Tompkins J in relation to section 151 of the 55 
Act from Maloc Construction Ltd (in liq) v Chadwick & Ors (1986) 3 NZCLC 99,794, p 99,809: 
There must be a causative connection between the failure and the inability to pay the debts or the 
substantial uncertainty as to the assets and liabilities or the substantial impediment to the winding up of 
the company. It follows from that that in exercising the discretion regard should be had to the causative 
effect of the actions or inactions of the officer, that is, the extent to which those actions or inactions 
have contributed to the failure to comply and to the consequence on the position of the company at 
liquidation resulting from that failure. In considering what part of the debts should be included in the 
declaration the extent of the loss resulting from the failure to comply with sec 151 may, in some cases, 
be decisive. But where, as here, the ground upon which the declaration is made is substantial 
uncertainty as to the assets and liabilities of the company that very uncertainty may make it impossible 
to assess with any precision the effect of the failure to comply. 
Petherick, above n 219, pp 193-194; 99,960-99,961. 
Duration would be relevant to an award under paragraph 320( I )(b ), however, where it would be wrong to make a 
director liable for a portion of the company's debts owing at liquidation, where the director was responsible for the 
business being carried on recklessly although no further debts were incurred. See Petherick, above n 219, p 194; 
99,981. With all respect to Eichelbaum J, it is hard to imagine a situation where a company will have been carried 
on recklessly but no further debts incurred. 
Eichelbaum J maligned: 
No doubt the liquidator has done his best but one would have wished for more detailed information 
regarding the fortunes of the company at various stages. In between balance dates, one has to make do 
with such scraps of information as are available. 
See Petherick, above n 219, p 179; 99,948. 
Petherick, above n 219, p 195 ; 99,962. 
Above n 242. 
Above n 242. 
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TF f p 245 b Y my rocessors 
In Vinyl Processors, the company had five directors: Sand H who were full time employees 
also, and C, B and K who were non-executive and professional chartered accountants. In 
June 1984, draft accounts showed the business had made a loss to year end March 1984 of 
$124,803. The directors, although knowing the company was in a difficult trading position, 
decided to keep trading. The directors met approximately monthly, and at their next meeting 
in August 1984 accounts for April to June 1984 showed another loss. At meetings in 
September, October and November 1984 the directors knew sales targets for 'break even' 
trading were not being met. The directors then decided to try and introduce a business 
partner (new shareholder) to improve liquidity, and concentrated most of their efforts on 
attempting to keep the business going so it ( or part of it) could be sold as a going concern. 
The directors met next in May 1985, their efforts at selling the company being unsuccessful. 
Receivers were appointed in May 1985 and a liquidator in November 1985. The liquidator 
brought proceedings under paragraph 320(1)(a) of the 55 Act, seeking declarations that the 
directors were personally responsible for all or part of the company's debts and liabilities 
incurred between June 1984, when the directors first learnt of the trading loss for the previous 
financial year, and April 1985, prior to the receiver being appointed. For the directors it was 
argued they should have relief pursuant to section 468 of the 5 5 Act
246 on the ground they had 
247 
acted reasonably. 
Hillyer J in the High Court agreed with counsel that Petherick was the leading case on section 
320 and endorsed the principles enunciated by Eichelbaum J as to its interpretation.
248 On the 
facts, it was apparent from at least June 1984 that the company was generating insufficient 
funds from which to meet its outgoings. Counsel for the directors argued that although 
245 
246 
247 
248 
See Vinyl Processors, above n I. 
55 Act, subsection 468( I) provides: 
486(1) Relief from liability If in any proceeding for negligence, default, breach of duty, or breach of trust against 
an officer of a company or a person employed by a company as auditor (whether he is or is not an officer of the 
company) it appears to the Court hearing the case that that officer or person is or may be liable in respect of the 
negligence, default, breach of duty, or breach of trust, but that he has acted honestly and reasonably, and that, 
having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including those connected with his appointment, he ought fairly 
to be excused for the negligence, default, breach of duty, or breach of trust, that Court may relieve him, either 
wholly or partly, from his liability on such terms as the Court may think fit. 
See Vinyl Processors, above n I, pp 417-428; 34-45 for the facts of the case generally. 
Vinyl Processors, above n I, p 420; 37. 
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liabilities were being incurred, creditors were giving credit, in normal cases for a month 
following the 20th of the month of delivery and in other cases for 60 days following the 20th 
of the month. However, the court considered that financial data showed the company's 
position dramatically deteriorating, and notwithstanding this deterioration the company 
continued to incur substantial debts. Indeed the use of accounting data in the case was 
considerable. The liquidator produced a schedule of the 'liquidity deficit'
249 for the months of 
July 1984 to April 1985, which showed the company had liquidity deficits of between -
$17,320 in June 1984 and -$108,574 in April 1985, reaching a low of-$246,774 in February 
1985. A witness for the directors referred to the 'net trade credit ratio'
250 as a means of 
assessing the ability of the company to meet its obligations. From September 1984 to April 
1985, the net credit ratio was invariably less than one, demonstrating in Hillyer J's words "at 
no time during that period could the company pay its debts as they became payable from the 
accounts receivable." 
Ultimately, Hillyer J decided the directors should have ceased trading after the end of 
251 
November 1984. Why November 1984 was chosen and not earlier was not made clear by 
His Honour. It was probably to do with the pattern of trading and directors' meetings, 
however. In September 1984, the directors decided the company would continue to trade if 
sales exceeded $200,000 a month (the figure previously recognised as a break even sales 
target) and the August 1984 sales figure was $272,765 thus more than breaking even. 
However sales for September and October 1984 were both below $200,000 and at the 
directors' meeting of November 1984 a decision was made to find a new partner for the 
company. The next scheduled meeting was never held which prompted Hillyer J to comment 
"I would have thought that with the desperate situation that the company was in it would have 
249 
250 
251 
Liquidity deficit was calculated as a formula A - B + C - D - E - F, where: 
A were the debts owing at the close of the month 
B were the unpresented cheques at the close of the month 
C was utilised bank overdraft available 
D were the creditors incurred during the month 
E was monthly commitments, and 
F the adjustment for creditors out of the purchases journal being cheques not drawn until the month 
following due date. 
See Vinyl Processors, above n I, p 421 ;38. 
The net trade credit ration was the ratio of accounts receivable to accounts payable, i.e., if accounts receivable and 
accounts payable were equal, the ratio would be one. 
Vinyl Processors, above n I, p 428; 44, where Hillyer J noted: 
Bearing in mind the hope that springs eternal with the directors in a company which is facing hard 
times, I have come to the conclusion that the very latest the directors should have continued trading was 
the end of November I 984. 
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been a matter of vital concern to all directors to meet and make decisions without delay" .2
52 
Indeed, the accountant called by the directors noted the October-November 1984 period was 
"really the crunch",
253 which appears to have influenced Hillyer Jin reaching his finding. On 
the facts, it was estimated from the available accounting information that the debts incurred 
by the company between the end of November 1984 and commencement of the receivership 
were $194,154. 
In making his determination, Hillyer J reiterated the burden of proof upon the liquidator was 
on the balance of possibilities, although regard should be had for the serious consequences of 
liability for the directors. 
254 And, in this regard, no distinction was to be drawn between the 
non-executive and executive directors. Counsel for the non-executive directors submitted 
section 320 was not designed to protect creditors as a whole, but rather related to the 
contracting of particular debts, and on the facts, the non-executive directors had no particular 
knowledge of the incurring of trading debts. Hillyer J firmly rejected the argument noting: 
That sort of approach ... in my view would totally nullify what I consider to be the intended effect of the 
section ... ff the section applied only to individual debt of which a director had personal knowledge, the 
section could not operate. It is clear in my view that the section does cover the action of directors 
approving the incurring of debts in the ordinary conduct of a business. It obviously would not cover 
any extraordinary debt incurred by management that the directors would not expect, but the debts that 
have been made are the sort of debts the directors must have expected would be incurred. 
The final issue was the quantum of the liability of the directors. Hillyer J, however, noted "I 
do not think ... that a simple calculation of the way in which debt has been incurred after a 
particular point is necessarily the proper way to arrive at the amount to be fixed under the 
section",255 and he emphasised the discretionary nature of the award, notwithstanding the 
considerable amount of financial data available.
256 Although, at least four different methods 
252 
25] 
214 
215 
256 
Vinyl Processors, above n I, p 425; 41. 
Above n I. 
Regarding the burden of proof, Hillyer J noted, Vinyl Processors, above n I, p 428; 44 : 
... it is not a criminal allegation that as being made which must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It 
is, however, an extremely serious allegation, and, as with any civil cases, the proof. while being on the 
preponderance of probabilities must still have regard to the serious nature of consequences for the 
defendant. 
Vinyl Processors, above n I, p 429; 46. 
Hillyer J noted of Tompkins J in Maloc Construction Ltd v Chadwick Love grove & Burr ( 1986) 2 BCR 217, Vinyl 
Processors, above n I, p 439; 47: 
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of quantifying the award were noted,
257 His Honour appeared to ultimately eschew a strict 
formulation, finding a figure of $180,000 appropriate. Moreover, the five directors were 
severally liable for the figure, but not, and significantly, jointly and severally liable, "because 
I do not consider that any one director should have to pay more than his share of the 
responsibility if any other director is unable to bear it. "
258 
Finally, there was no relief for the directors under section 468 of the 55 Act,
259 as relief can 
only be granted under that section if the director behaved reasonably, and His Honour held a 
finding against a director under section 320 would prohibit a grant ofrelief under section 468. 
5 The duty to avoid imperformable obligations: suggested parameters 
It is first opportune to contrast paragraph 320(1)(a) with section 136. The most obvious 
difference is that section 136 will theoretically apply at any time. However, as with section 
135 it is submitted this will be of little moment due to the circumstances in which section 
136's beneficiaries, i.e., creditors
260 would have any incentive to try and invoke it. The next 
difference is the change in terminology from "debts" to "obligations". On a literal 
interpretation "obligations" appears the broader term, possibly encompassing, for example, 
goods or services.
261 It is yet to be seen whether the courts will take an expansive approach 
to interpreting section 136. Theoretically the section has the potential to afford greater 
protection to those it is designed to benefit than did paragraph 320(1)(a), but as financial 
257 
258 
259 
260 
261 
He, however, did not have the benefit of the detailed and careful information that has been put before 
me as to an accountant's calculation ... of the amount of the deficiency .... Nevertheless, I think ii still 
becomes a matter in which the Court's discretion must be exercised. 
For example, the following methods were quantified: 
(a) the total loss basis: the total loss suffered by unsecured creditors as a result of the liquidation, bein
g the 
fund deficiency regarding directors; 
(b) Marginal total loss: the difference between the surplus which would have been available had
 the 
liquidation taken place when the directors should have stopped trading and the surplus actually 
available; 
(c) Individual marginal loss : the loss suffered by creditors on an individual basis being the diffe
rence 
between the distribution they could expect from liquidation ; and 
(d) Marginal charge net trade credit: the marginal change in the net trade credit deficiency between w
hen 
the directors should have stopped trading and when they did . 
Vinyl Processors, above n I, p 430; 47. 
See above ['l~G-S...M,,0.o....;i..;l.4"""~ h "). l{ 6 
The duty contained in section 13 1 strictly to the company, however: see 93 Act, subsection 169(3). 
Conceptually it is difficult to see how a consumer of a good or service to be provided by the company could
 have 
standing to enforce the duty, however. The available means by which creditors may enforce the remedy, se
ction 
30 I of the 93 Act, is only available to "the liquidator or a creditor or shareholder"(section 30 I). It would b
e 
considerably stretching the language of the provision to describe such consumers as "creditors" in this context
. 
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to interpreting section 136. Theoretically the section has the potential to afford greater 
protection to those it is designed to benefit than did paragraph 320(1)(a), but as financial 
solvency is the ultimate barometer of corporate health it is submitted the new terminology 
will not significantly alter the nature of the provision from an essential focus upon financial 
obligations. Furthermore, Hillyer J's comments in Vinyl Processors may limit the scope of 
"obligations" in circumstances where directors have delegated management of the company, 
when he said paragraph 320(l)(a) "would not cover any extraordinary debt incurred by 
management that the directors would not expect...".
262 Possibly section 136 will not, 
therefore, impose a duty on directors where their company has incurred an unusual obligation 
at the behest of management without the directors' knowledge which the company has been 
unable to perform. 
The final textual difference is the nature of the directors' belief required. A director governed 
by the 93 Act must believe the obligation can be performed when it is required to do so. 
Officers under the 55 Act had to believe the debt at issue and all other debts of the company 
could be paid when due. In practice, it is submitted, this may be significant. If a director 
under the 93 Act has her or his company incur an obligation that the director knows the 
company could perform but only at the expense of an obligation already incurred, this is 
arguably a sufficient belief for the director to avoid liability. On balance though, it is 
unlikely a court, while recognising this subjective belief, would find it reasonable in the 
circumstances. It must surely be implicit in section 136 that the company's ability to perform 
the obligation is contingent on it being able to perform all its other obligations also. 
These differences aside, what director behaviour is likely to be impugned? The crux of the 
section, for any party seeking to invoke it, will obviously be the sorts of grounds that will 
objectively rebut a subjective belief held by a director. From the cases decided under 
paragraph 320(l)(a) it is clear that continuing to incur debts whilst insolvent in a balance 
sheet sense will not of itself suffice. Rather consistent liquidity insolvency is likely to 
occasion a breach of the duty. For example, Vinyl Processors demonstrates, as did Thompson 
v Innes in the context of reckless trading, that continuing to incur obligations in the light of 
ongoing failure to meet necessary revenue targets, e.g., monthly sales targets, will probably 
262 
Above n 255. 
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to incur debts whilst insolvent did not per se breach paragraph 320(1)(a). However, the 
reliance upon accounting records, in Vinyl Processors especially, shows the courts' readiness 
to examine such information in determining the reasonableness of the director's belief 
concerning the incursion of debts in the circumstances. Moreover, proving the absence of 
such subjective belief will not be easy. In Petherick, only overt behaviour evident of the lack 
of belief sufficed, e.g., the practice of writing cheques to pay creditors and not sending them 
when due but waiting until sufficient funds had been received by the company to meet the 
cheque. 
E Remedies Under Sections 135 And 136, Potential Orders And Director Relief 
Remedies for a breaches of the duties contained in sections 135 and 136 include the standard 
injunction where the course of action has not been completed,
263 and an action by the 
company directly or by shareholders derivatively,
264 where losses have been suffered, 
although the possibility of either seems remote prior to liquidation. 
265 Neither of these 
remedies would in reality be available to creditors, however. Injunctions may only be applied 
for by the company, a director or shareholder or an entitled person.
266 Similarly, an action by 
the company would require director approval. Thus, for those that will be most concerned 
with the breach, the creditors, their only remedy will be pursuant to section 301 of the 93 Act 
once the company is placed in liquidation.
267 Once in liquidation, a creditor could have 
standing to apply to the court to have the director repay the creditor for company property lost 
via the director's breach of duty.
268 Section 301 of the 93 Act is largely equivalent to the 
previous section 321 of the 55 Act, which was used to action behaviour typically grouped 
under the title "director misfeasance", although the reference to the same has long since 
disappeared from the provision. Thus from the practical viewpoint of available remedies, 
notwithstanding that both sections 135 and 136 purport to be owed continuously, given that 
they are substantively for the benefit of creditors, creditors appear little better off than they 
26) 
264 
265 
266 
267 
268 
93 Act, section 164. 
See 93 Act, sections 165-168. 
As noted, section 136 is one of the duties explicitly owed to the company and not shareholders; 93 Act, subsection 
169(3). 
93 Act, subsection 164(2). An entitled person mean a shareholder or a person whom the company's constitution 
confers the rights and powers of a shareholder; 93 Act, subsection 2( I). 
93 Act, section 30 I enables the court to order directors or others to repay misapplied company property. 
93 Act, paragraph 3 0 I ( 1 )( c ). 
WG953 I I 0.242 
-55-
notwithstanding that both sections 135 and 136 purport to be owed continuously, given that 
they are substantively for the benefit of creditors, creditors appear little better off than they 
were previously under the 55 Act, as both regimes only permit creditor redress in 
circumstances of liquidation. 
As noted, any action by creditors will be pursuant to section 301 of the 93 Act. Section 301 
enables a court to order repayment or restoration of money or property to the company, or the 
contribution of an equivalent sum, in any amount the court thinks just. This is basically the 
same discretion the court had under section 321 of the 55 Act. The 93 Act appears to go 
further, however. Paragraph 301(l)(c) empowers the court to order a director "to pay or 
transfer the money or property [that has been misapplied by the director or for which she or 
he has become liable] ... to the creditor". This is notable, not just as an extension of the 55 
Act position, but rather that it seems to permit a creditor to usurp the normal order for the 
distribution of assets of a company upon its liquidation.
269However, ultimately the remedy is 
discretionary2
70and it is submitted a court would be unlikely to grant an order which would 
have such effect. 
Regardless of this conceptual extension from the 55 Act, the courts' treatment of its discretion 
granted under section 321 of the 55 Act will undoubtedly influence its approach to section 
301. A survey of the case law reveals a few guiding principles but in the end the 
discretionary nature of the remedy means the facts of each case will determine the particular 
order. Bisson J in Thompson v Innes awarded only half the liquidator's claim and gave no 
real guidance as to how he balanced the considerations relevant to his award.
271 By contrast, 
in Rex Wood Doogue J ordered the director personally responsible for the whole sum owing 
to creditors upon the company's liquidation.
272 In Electronics, Ongley J saw fit to order the 
director to pay the calculated losses occurring to the company after the time it was found it 
should have been wound up.
273 However probably the fullest exposition of the appropriate 
principles the court should apply in exercising its discretion under section 320 of the 55 Act 
269 
270 
271 
272 
273 
See 93 Act, section 3 12 and Seventh Schedule to the Act. 
The operative word in section 301 being "may". See above n 113. 
See above Part III Section C Subsection 5 Paragraph a - Thompson v Innes. 
See above Part Ill Section C Subsection 5 Paragraph b - the Rex Wood decision . 
See above Part III Section C Subsection 5 Paragraph d - the Electronics case. 
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result of the breach of the section. Any funds so recovered would go towards the general 
assets of the company. Moreover, in line with Ongley J's comments in Electronics that, in 
the context of reckless trading the amount awarded should be limited to those losses incurred 
after the company should have been wound up, Eichelbaum J considered in regard to 
incurring obligations that the amount recoverable "should relate and be limited to those debts 
incurred in the absence of honest belief, on reasonable grounds, that the company would be 
able to pay them as they fell due".
275 Of more difficulty is whether the courts, in cases of two 
or more directors, are likely to impose joint and several or only several liability. In 
Thompson v Innes Bisson J thought the former was appropriate (but, as noted, he gave little 
reasoning for his decision), whilst in Vinyl Processors Hillyer J thought the directors should 
only be severally liable "because I do not consider that any one director should have to pay 
more than his share of the responsibility if any other director is unable to bear it. "
276 It is 
submitted this discrepancy merely evidences that the court's order under section 301 will be 
largely driven by the facts of the particular matter. 
Counsel for the directors in many of the cases under paragraphs 320(1)(a) and 320(1)(b) 
attempted to argue the applicability of section 468 of the 55 Act. Section 468 essentially 
empowered the court to grant relief in proceedings involving breach of trust against company 
officers. A largely analogous provision is provided by section 376 of the 93 Act.
277 The 
emphasis under both provisions is upon the reasonableness of the directors' actions. It is 
submitted new section 376 is unlikely to save directors who have breached either section 135 
or 136 of the 93 Act. As breach of section 136 will necessarily require an absence of belief 
on reasonable grounds, then a fortiori it highly unlikely that same court would also be 
prepared to say the director "took all reasonable and proper steps" as section 376 requires.
278 
Although section 13 5 makes no express reference to the reasonableness of the directors 
275 
276 
277 
278 
Petherick, above n 219, p 192; 99,960. 
Vinyl Processors, above n I , p 430; 47. 
93 Act, subsection 376( I) provides: 
376(1) Defences relating to board's duty It is a defence to a director charged with an offence in relation to a duty 
imposed on the board of a company if the director proves that-
(a) The board took all reasonable and proper steps to ensure that the requirements of this Act would be 
complied with; or 
(b) He or she took all reasonable and proper steps to ensure that the board complied with the requirements of 
this Act; or 
(c) In the circumstances he or she could not reasonably have been expected to take steps to ensure that the 
board complied with the requirements of this Act. 
Such an interpretation is consistent with the comments of I lillyer J in Vinyl Processors where in deciding an 
action under paragraph 320( l )(a) of the 55 Act, he held a finbing against a director under that provision would 
prohibit a grant of relief under section 468 of the 55 Act. See Vinyl Processors, above n l , p 440; 48. 
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actions, it appears the defence would similarly not be available upon the very same reasoning 
as Tipping J employed in Lake Tekapo. His Honour's comment that "in cases where a person 
has been found to have acted recklessly it would seem to me to be unlikely that he could also 
be found to have acted reasonably"
279 
seems equally applicable to the 93 Act's reckless 
trading provision. 
F Other Relevant 93 Act Provisions: The Greater Scheme Of Creditor Protection 
Although companies come to an end because their purpose is spent or because those in control 
are in a state of deadlock, by far and away the more common reason is insolvency. 
Recognising this, the 93 Act makes considerable provision regarding the ascertainment and 
adjustment of entitlements of the relevant interest groups, be they secured creditors, unsecured 
creditors, employees or shareholders, upon a company's demise. In addition to the duties of 
directors comprised in sections 135 and 136 that clearly benefit creditors, the 93 Act contains 
several other provisions, though not expressed in terms of duties upon directors, that are 
designed to restrict the company's right to deal with its assets in the period leading up to 
insolvency. These include prohibitions on transactions at an undervalue,
280 transactions 
h · ,:: · 1 fCC 281 ·d bl h 282 h 1 · ,:: · 
283 d 
avmg a pre1erentia e 1ect, vo1 a e c arges, t e genera m1s1easance section, an a 
prohibition upon carrying on business fraudulently.
284 Thus directors duties are but part of a 
greater regulatory framework imposed on the company entity to protect its, or perhaps rather 
its stakeholders, interests. The effect of this regime will become more apparent in the next 
section. 
279 
280 
281 
282 
28] 
284 
Lake Tekapo , above n 196, p I 00, 174. 
93 Act, section 297. 
93 Act, section 292. 
93 Act, section 293 . 
93 Act, section 3 0 I. 
93 Act, section 380. 
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IV AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONTINUED RELEVANCE OF THE 
COMMON LAW DUTY REGARDING CREDITORS: 
DOES IT ADD ANYTHING TO THE 93 ACT? 
A Introduction 
This section will attempt to analyse whether the body of case law supportive of a common law 
duty upon directors to consider their company's creditors' interests will, as a matter of 
substance, have any relevance to directors after the advent of the 93 Act. It should be noted, 
that such a query is not novel. It has been said of the case law:2
85 
If these judicial utterances are examined in their context, it will be seen that in most cases they are 
nothing more than extraneous words of censure directed at conduct which anyway comes within some 
well established rule of law, such as the law imposing liability for misfeasance, the expropriation of 
corporate assets or fraudulent preference. 
The analysis will proceed by applying the provisions of the 93 Act, particularly sections 135 
and 136 and the duties to directors contained therein where applicable, to the fact patterns of 
the cases comprising the body of case law supportive of the directors' duty towards creditors. 
As an initial observation, many of the cases comprising the case law had a number of features 
in common. The companies involved typically were closely controlled, being either one 
person companies, family companies, incorporated partnerships or group companies. 
Moreover, the acts in question often took place with the full knowledge of all the 
shareholders. Lastly, the companies were invariably insolvent at the time proceedings were 
brought - a liquidator being left to sue as plaintiff in the name of the company. 
B The New Zealand Cases 
1 Permakraft 
The fact pattern of Permakraft is essentially this: 
285 
LS Sealy "Directors' Duties - An Unnecessary Gloss" [I 988] CLJ I 75, p 175. 
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P Ltd was a manufacturing company with subscribed capital of $25,000. Approximately 68% of the 
shares were held by N, 6% by his wife, 25% beneficially owned by their family trust and 1 % by an 
employee. N, was governing director, and his wife and her brother directors. In the early 1970's P 
Ltd made steady profits, although by 1975 this had fallen to only $565 on sales of $520,866. P Ltd 
was undercapitalised and had liquidity problems. At the time there were price control regulations in 
place
286 which prevented P Ltd raising its prices. However, if P Ltd leased its buildings and land, 
instead of owning them, the rental paid thereon would constitute a justification under the regulations 
for a price increase. A reconstruction plan was devised which was acceptable to the secured creditors. 
A holding company, H Ltd, was formed to acquire nearly all the shares of P Ltd and its land and 
buildings at market value, as per a registered valuation, and above book value by $148,323 . The 
capital profit to be made by P Ltd from the sale was distributed pro rata to its shareholders as a capital 
dividend. The dividend and the share sale proceeds enabled P Ltd's old shareholders to inject 
$160,000 as capital for H Ltd. The greater capital of H Ltd, relative to P Ltd, was hoped to facilitate 
increased borrowings. The resulting increase in P Ltd's prices was greater than the rental costs, 
incorporating other overheads and an increased profit margin. The scheme was implemented in July 
1975. By March 1976 P Ltd was trading profitably. However, in the latter part of 1976 P Ltd 
encountered financial difficulties. There was evidence of industry recession, two other manufacturers 
in the industry went into liquidation also in this period. For the year to March 1977 P Ltd lost 
$135,960. Receivership and liquidation ensued. 
In Permakraft the liquidator took an action against P Ltd's directors to recover the amount of 
the capital profit distributed to shareholders.
287 The Court of Appeal however, ultimately 
rejected the liquidator's action. Despite Cooke J's wide reaching dicta concerning directors' 
owing a duty to creditors,
288 it was merely that: obiter dicta. On the facts, he found the 
directors had acted reasonably and should not have foreseen their actions as being likely to 
cause loss to creditors.
289 Similarly, it would appear an action under the 93 Act for reckless 
trading pursuant to section 135 would not be available. If Bisson J's recklessness test from 
286 
287 
283 
289 
Price Stabilisation Regulations 1974, see Permakraft, above n 59, p 245 . 
The liquidator's case was argued under three heads. First, there was no proper declaration of the dividend 
authorising its payment. Secondly, even if there was, the payment was not bona fide for the benefit of the 
company and was in breach of the director's duties. Thirdly, in either event, the company was entitled to 
repayment of the amount as disbursed together with interest. See Permakraft (No. 2) Ltd (In Liquidation) v 
Nicholson & Ors (1982) 2 NZCLC 99,758 (High Court) per White J, p 99,364. 
See above Part II Section C Subsection 2 Paragraph a - New Zealand authority, and text accompanying above n 
61. 
See Permakraft, above n 59, p 253 , per Cooke J: 
The course that was in/act taken, while removing the land and buildings from the company 's ownership, 
at least kept them within the group and helped to make further loan funds available to the group as a 
whole. I would not be prepared to dismiss that as an unreasonable course or as one which the directors 
ought to have foreseen as likely to cause loss to creditors. 
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Thompson v Innei
90 
is adopted as a proxy for "a substantial risk of serious loss to the 
company's creditors", it is unlikely a different result to Cooke J's would be reached. If it is 
asked whether there was "something in the financial position of this company which would 
have drawn the attention of an ordinary prudent director to the real possibility not so slight as 
to be negligible risk, that his continuing to carry on the business of the company ... "
291 then 
the answer is probably "no". P Ltd was solvent immediately after the restructuring and 
dividend, had greater profit margins, and had received consideration at market value for its 
assets (as opposed to a price obtained in a forced sale). Indeed, its profits increased in the 
immediate period after the transaction. Reading the Court of Appeal's decision, it is apparent 
other factors, such as general industry decline, probably played a larger role in P Ltd's 
ultimate failure.
292 In this regard the decision of Lake Tekapo under paragraph 320(1)(b) of 
the 55 Act would appear to be analogous, where Tipping J said if the company was solvent at 
the relevant time the director's actions in paying the capital dividend could not have been held 
to be reckless.
293 
Likewise, section 136 would not appear to alter the result. Although it is arguable a dividend 
is not an "obligation" of the company, in the strict sense, if it is assumed it is an obligation (in 
that, once declared, the company should pay the dividend) then on the Permakraft fact 
pattern, regardless of the director's subjective belief that the obligation ( dividend) could be 
performed (paid), this objectively was proven to be so on the facts. The 93 Act, moreover, 
provides much better creditor protection than merely general duties of directors for the benefit 
of creditors to guard against the "mischief' of unjustifiable capital dividends
294 via section 
56. Under the section, if a 93 Act company cannot satisfy the solvency test2
95 immediately 
after a distribution
296 then the distribution may initially be recovered from the shareholder 
recipient,297 and if not, the directors are personally liable for whatever part of the distribution 
290 
291 
292 
293 
294 
295 
296 
297 
See above part 111 Section C Subsection 3 - Prima facie meaning of "a substantial risk of serious loss to
 the 
company's creditors." 
Bisson J's formulation of reckless for the purposes of 55 Act, paragraph 320(i)(b ). 
Permakraft, above n 59, p 246. 
Lake Tekapo, above n 219, p I 00, 172. 
Of which, it is submitted, Permakraft, is not an example. 
93 Act, subsection 4( I) provides: 
For the purposes of this Act, a company satisfies the solvency test if-
(a) The company is able to pay its debts as they become due in the normal course of business; and 
(b) The value of the company's assets is greater than the value of its liabilities including cont
ingent 
liabilities. 
A dividend is a distribution, see 93 Act, section 53 . 
93 Act, subsection 56( I). 
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is not recovered from shareholders (if there were not reasonable grounds for believing the 
company would satisfy the solvency test at the time of the distribution).
298 In conclusion, it is 
submitted Permakraft is not a fact pattern where the directors should have been culpable for 
declaring the capital dividend. Prior to the restructuring the company was barely profitable 
and suffering liquidity problems. In such circumstances it was likely liquidation would ensue 
in the normal course of events. The restructuring, involving the dividend, rejuvenated the 
business, and the company received market value for the assets used to finance the dividend, 
which would have been unlikely had they been sold in a liquidation context. In this regard it 
appears reasonable that the 93 Act would not impose liability on the directors for breaches of 
sections 135 or 136. Thus, it is respectfully submitted, the Court of Appeal was correct in its 
decision on the facts, notwithstanding the far reaching, but obviously obiter dicta, statements 
of Cooke J. 
2 The Hilton case 
The facts of Hilton were akin to Permakraft in that they involved a company declaring a 
capital dividend: 
H Ltd was owned and directed by Mr & Mrs H. Declining profitability forced the Hs' cheque 
account into overdraft. The Hs were advised by their accountant to sell H Ltd's factory and declare a 
capital dividend out of the resulting profit. The factory was sold and the dividend declared. In the 
months leading up to the declaration H Ltd was either at or over its overdraft limit. It had received 
several section 218 notices, which the court construed as evidence H Ltd was unable to pay its debts 
as they fell due. Following the declaration it was found H Ltd was either in or very close to balance 
sheet insolvency. 
In the case, "no express reliance was placed on any statutory provision. "
299 
The liquidator 
sought a declaration that it had acted fraudulently or negligently in declaring the dividend, 
a~d that the dividend had been declared contrary to the law. Tipping J held the dividend was 
unlawful as a return of capital and the credit entry in the Hs' cheque account reversed. 
298 
299 
93 Act, subsection 56(2). Non-compliance with the certification procedure for passing the solvency test is another 
basis for director liabilities. 
Hilton , above n 68, p 64,746 per Tipping J. This appears odd as the facts would clearly appear to satisfy an action 
in reckless trading pursuant to paragraph 320( 1 )(b) 55 Act. 
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Similarly, the Hs were liable to compensate H Ltd in respect of their breaches of duty as 
directors. The duty, as enunciated by His Honour, was to ascertain H Ltd's financial position 
prior to declaring the dividend.
300 As they had not, the Hs were both negligent and in breach 
301 
of duty. 
Would the Hs be similarly liable under the 93 Act? Probably yes. The real mischief in 
Hilton was that the declaration of the dividend at a time when the company was going to be 
unable to pay its debts as they fell due and arguably balance sheet insolvent as well. The 93 
Act's provisions as to distributions
302 would prevent the directors of the company from 
certifying, on reasonable grounds, as to satisfaction of the solvency test after the dividend, 
and non-compliance would have results similar those in the case: repayment of the dividend 
by the director-shareholders.
303 
Whether the Hs would also have been guilty of breaches of statutory duties under the 93 Act 
is not so clear. Again, section 136 does not appear apt, dividends not fitting well with the 
notion of "obligation" central to the section. (Indeed, it is notable that if the dividend were 
classified as an obligation for the purposes of section 136, the company did perform its 
obligation - thereby satisfying the directors' duty under section 136 - notwithstanding it was 
insolvent in liquidity terms and arguably upon its balance sheet also!) An action for breach of 
duty pursuant to section 135 of the 93 Act for reckless trading would, however, appear to 
clearly place liability onto the directors. Under the 55 Act, merely because a company was 
insolvent when a dividend was declared did not make the declaration reckless for the purpose 
of paragraph 320(1)(b) of the 55 Act, however.
304 Even so, notwithstanding this dubious 
contention,305 when a company is unable to meet its debts as they fall due and immediately 
after the proposed transaction will fail the balance sheet test of insolvency, on an objective 
JOO 
JOI 
302 
303 
304 
lOS 
Hilton , above n 68, p 64,751 , where Tipping J notes: 
The duty of directors {is} to take reasonable steps to ascertain the financial position of a company 
before declaring a dividend. 
Hilton, above n 68, p 64,754. 
93 Act, section 56. 
See above Part TV Section B Subsection I - Permakraft, for a discussion of the results of non-compliance with the 
distribution procedure established by section 56 of the 93 Act. 
See Lake Tekapo, above n I 96, p I 00, 773 , per Tipping J. It is submitted this aspect of this decision should be 
confined to its particular facts , as not only was payment of a dividend in circumstances of trading and balance 
sheet insolvency later held to be contrary to the law (see Tipping Jin Hilton , above n 68, p 64, 750, points (4) and 
(5)), it would seem to go to the heart of disregarding creditors' interests at an objective level, which is surely the 
mischief the prohibition upon reckless trading was meant to address. 
Above n 304. 
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. . f . 135 306 h apphcat10n o section , as t e company would not be able to satisfy the 93 Act's 
solvency test (the 93 Act's major instrument of creditor protection) this would more than 
likely constitute the company being carried on in a manner likely to create a substantial risk 
of serious loss to the company's creditors. Failing the solvency test would surely raise a "real 
possibility not so slight as to be a negligible risk
11307 that carrying on the business of the 
company would cause serious loss to the creditors of the company. Thus, it is apparent that if 
the facts of Hilton arose under the 93 Act they would most probably be decided in a similar 
manner. 
3 The Neil case 
Strictly, Neil was a case concerning an order to remove a caveat. Nevertheless, the facts of 
the case demonstrate director misconduct: 
N was governing director and owned all but one share in D Ltd. The day prior to the appointment of 
receivers in respect of D Ltd, N entered into an agreement to buy D Ltd's only asset, a property for 
$275,000. The property had twice been valued at $350,000. The property secured first, second and 
third mortgages to the sum of $150,000 and also a debenture from D Ltd securing approximately 
$300,000. N had placed a caveat on the property protecting his interest as purchases. 
As to the issue of the caveat, Smellie J held the balance of convenience rested upon lifting the 
caveat (placed by N in respect of his interest as purchaser of the property) because the sale 
was at a clear undervalue and N's conduct was unsatisfactory.
308 Smellie J noted of the 
proceedings "we are once again faced with the question of whether or not a governing 
director, .. . , contemplating the purchase of the one remaining asset of a company on the verge 
of receivership must take into account the interest of creditors of the company.
11 309 His 
Honour concluded the director should have or ought to have known a sale at the price 
obtained would prejudice the company's major creditor. 
306 
307 
308 
309 
It is submitted section 135 is an objective test. See above Part Ill Section C subsection 6 - suggested parameters 
of the 93 Act's section 135 duty regarding reckless trading. 
Using Bisson J's test in Thompson v Innes, see above n 155. 
Neil, above n 65, p 99,672. 
Neil, above n 65, p 99,671 . 
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Under the 93 Act on the above facts, and if the company was to go into eventual liquidation, 
express remedies appear provided to the liquidator under section 297 - transactions at 
undervalue and section 298 - transactions for inadequate or excessive consideration with 
directors and certain other persons. In an action under either section, the liquidator would be 
able to recover the amount by which the value of the company's property disposed over 
exceeded the consideration received by it.
310 Again, an action under section 136 seems 
inapplicable, and given the likelihood of recovery under either section 297 or 298, an action 
for reckless trading pursuant to section 135 would appear largely redundant. Nevertheless, 
for similar reasons to those in Hilton
311 it is submitted an action for breach of section 135 
would probably be successful if argued. 
C The Australian Cases 
1 Walker v Wimbome 
This case had the following fact pattern: 
310 
311 
R, P & D Wimborne were directors of A Ltd, one of a group of companies with common directors, 
authorised four payments by the company. The directors had formulated a general policy for moving 
funds between the companies in the group to meet emergencies as they arose. A Ltd went into 
liquidation. Four payments were challenged: 
I. the first, to a company in the group in financial difficulty. The only consideration was the 
recipient company's implied promise to repay the sum. On day of payment A Ltd 
borrowed the equivalent amount from a third company in group - secured by an equitable 
charge over A Ltd's assets. A Ltd was insolvent at the time; 
2. the second, to another company in the group for alleged consultancy work. The recipient 
company was not incorporated when part of work was carried out and there were no book 
entries to support the alleged entitlement; 
3. third, payments as salaries/wages to employees of other companies in the group with no 
evidence they had performed significant services for A Ltd; and 
93 Act, subsections 297(2) and 298(2). 
In Neil the company was about to have receivers appointed and thus clearly at least insolvent in liquidity terms. 
The disposal of the major asset of the company would be a major transaction pursuant to section 129 of the 93 
Act, which, as distributions, require the directors to certify compliance with the solvency test. Non-compliance, it 
is submitted, is clear evidence of reckless trading for section 135. 
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4. fourth, to a former director of A Ltd in recognition of past services. A decision to make 
these gratuitous payments by way of regular pension was made well before winding up 
became imminent. 
The four payments were challenged by the liquidator as having been made in breach of duty 
or trust under New South Wales' misfeasance provision.
312 The court held the directors liable 
for payments one, two and three. Under the 93 Act, with regard to the first payment, would 
probably be impugned by both sections 135 and 136. At least, taking on the additional 
borrowing, whilst being insolvent and knowing the company's capacity to repay depended 
upon another company known to be in financial difficulties being able to repay its debt, 
would not appear to be grounds on which a belief that the company could perform its 
obligation when called upon to do so, be objectively held (for the purposes of section 136). 
Regarding the second payment, Mason J in the case found that there was clear misfeasance as 
it was a serious breach of duty to make a payment on a basis that proved to be without 
foundation. 3
13 Strictly, the duties in section 135 or 136 would not appear breached by the 
conduct. However, the duty to act in the best interests of the company3
14 would clearly 
appear breached, and give rise to an action under section 301. Similar analysis can be applied 
to the third payment. 
2 Ring v Sutton 
The facts of Ring v Sutton are these: 
312 
lll 
314 
S and his wife were directors of N Limited. They were also the only shareholders of N Limited. S 
had received a number of loans from N Limited over several years prior to N Limited's eventual 
winding up. The rates of interest upon these loans were less than the rate of bank interest charged at 
the relevant time of the loans. S profited as a result of the transactions by the difference between the 
interest rate which should have been paid under contracts entered into with a bank and the interest 
payable under the contracts he procured as director. 
Companies Act 1961 (NSW), section 3678. 
Walker v Wimborne, above n 37, p JO. 
93 Act, section 13 I. 
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The liquidator brought an action against the director for damages for misfeasance. Giving the 
court's judgment, Hope J A declared the director had been guilty of breaches of duty as an 
officer of the company by causing it to lend to him sums of money over a period of years at 
interest rates lower than commercial rates. His Honour, drew the inference that the director 
obtained more favourable treatment because of his position as a director. None of the three 
loans were for the benefit of the company and the terms, as to interest, were detrimental to the 
315 
company. 
It would not appear that either section 136 nor section 135 of the 93 Act are applicable. 
Certainly, in making the loans, the company did not incur what could be said to be an 
obligation to make section 136 applicable. Likewise, it is unlikely that the director, in 
authorising the loans to himself at a below market interest rate, could be said to be trading 
recklessly for the purposes of section 135. At the time the loans were made, there was 
nothing in the financial position of the company that could really be construed as a real risk 
that serious loss to creditors would occur. On the facts, the amount of interest lost through 
the loans was approximately just over $30,000, whilst upon the company's winding up it had 
accumulated losses of approximately $280,000 and a deficiency of liabilities over assets of 
$265,000.316 It is submitted, however, that the director would have been in breach of section 
131 of the 93 Act which obliges directors to act in good faith and in the best interests of the 
company.317 Although the courts have been reluctant to second guess directors decisions, it is 
submitted that the effect of section 13 7 of the 93 Act is to be impose an objective element to 
the interpretation of the section 131 "best interests of the company" duty. As the company 
received no material benefit from the loans, objectively, it would be hard to justify that they 
were in the best interests of the company.318 Thus, again, although strictly the directors 
actions in the fact pattern may not be actionable under section 135 or 136 of the 93 Act, the 
93 Act elsewhere provides a suitable remedy against the director misconduct elsewhere. 
315 
) (6 
317 
J i& 
Ring v Sutton, above n 41, p 550. 
Ring v Sutton, above n 41, pp 546 & 550. 
93 Act, subsection 131 ( 1) provides: 
subject to this section, a director of the company, when exercising powers or performing duties, must act 
in good faith and in what the director believes to be the best interests of the company. 
Depending on whether at the time of making the loans, the director disclosed his interests in the transactions 
(assuming the company is a 93 Act company) in the interest register, the loans could be avoided by the company 
at any time up to three months after the transaction was eventually disclosed to its shareholders. See generally 93 
Act, sections 140 & 141. 
WG953 I 10.242 
-67-
3 The Kinsela case 
The facts of Kinsela were as follows: 
R Ltd was directed by Mr and Mrs K. Mr K owned all of the governing director shares and the 
ordinary shares were held between Mr and Mrs K and other members of the K family. In January 
1981 R Ltd entered into a lease of its business premises to the K's. On the facts, the court found R 
Ltd's financial position was "precarious". Earlier R Ltd's liabilities exceeded its assets by 
approximately $195,000. The rental payable on the lease was substantially below market rentals. In 
April 1981 R Ltd was ordered to be wound up as an insolvent company. The effect of the lease was 
to put R Ltd's asset (its business premises) beyond the immediate reach of its creditors. The 
shareholders ofR Ltd had unanimously approved R Ltd entering into the lease. 
In the case, Street CJ held that the entry into the lease by the directors was "in breach of their 
duty to the company in that it directly prejudiced the creditors of the company. It was 
accordingly a voidable transaction."
319 With regard to the application of the 93 Act, it should 
first be noted that the lease would not be a voidable preference pursuant to section 292, as the 
directors were not creditors of the company. Arguably, the lease may constitute a transaction 
at an undervalue,32° or a transaction for inadequate or excessive consideration with 
directors.321 It is submitted, however, that the directors would probably be liable for reckless 
trading under section 135. The facts raise the issue whether section 135 covers isolated 
transactions.322 As opposed to paragraph 320(1)(b) of the 55 Act, which referred to "any 
business of the company, and which the Court of Appeal held could include an isolated 
transaction - even a transaction not arising in the course of carrying on the company's usual 
business323 section 135 refers to carrying on "the" business of the company". It is submitted, 
the courts would take a similarly broad interpretation of section 135, as they did with 
319 
320 
321 
l22 
323 
Kinsela, above n 45 , p 224. 
93 Act, section 297. The lease would certainly be entered into within the specified period (which is one year prior 
to liquidation, subsection 297(3)), it was entered into when the company was unable to pay its debts, subparagraph 
297(l)(c)(i), and the directors ought to have known that this was the case, required by paragraph 297(l)(d), and, 
most improtantly, the value of the consideration received by the company, i.e. , the rental , was less than the value 
of the consideration provided by the company, i.e., the value of the business premises. If the foregoing was 
proven, a liquidator could recover from the directors the value of the excess consideration provided by the 
company. 
93 Act, section 298. The issue in this instance, will be whether the company disposed of property by leasing it to 
the directors (see subsection 298(2)). Again, if proven, the liquidator could recover from the directors the value of 
the excess consideration provided by the company. 
For further discussion, see above Part III Section C Subsection 6 - Suggested parameters of the 93 Act's section 
135 duty regarding reckless trading. 
See Nimbus, above n 171, 
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paragraph 320(1)(b) of the 55 Act, given the remedial nature of the provision. Moreover, if 
the aim of the section is to prevent losses to creditors, a restrictive interpretation to only the 
"core" business of the company would severely limit the section's effectiveness. A fortiori, 
where a company has disposed of its major asset, as it had on the facts of Kinsela, 
immediately prior to liquidation, it dramatically illustrates how a substantial loss can be 
inflicted upon creditors. On the facts of the case, the directors must have known removal 
from the company of its major asset, given its impending collapse, would "create a substantial 
risk of serious loss to the company's creditors." Once again, the present statute based law on 
directors' duties would appear to censure the director misconduct in another of the cases 
evidencing judicial sympathy for a common law duty of directors to creditors. 
4 Grove v Flavel 
Grove v Flavel was a case where the director of the impugned company was also a director of 
several related companies. The facts were: 
G was a director of B Ltd, as well as a director of five project companies and two family companies. 
Prior to February 1981 G and one of the family companies, M Ltd, were unsecured creditors of B 
Ltd. The project companies were all indebted to B Ltd, and had considerable assets in the form of 
real property. By virtue of his position as a director of B Ltd, G knew B Ltd was experiencing 
liquidity problems. He was also aware its bank had refused B Ltd a loan. In February 1981, B Ltd 
repaid a large portion of the amount it owed G, as well as all it owed to M Ltd. G then drew a cheque 
in favour of the other family company, which in turned drew a cheque in favour of B Ltd. M Ltd 
drew cheques in favour of B Ltd repaying all the debts owed to B Ltd by the project companies. The 
net effect of the transactions did not affect B Ltd's liquidity. However B Ltd's indebtedness to G was 
reduced, and the project companies become debtors ofM Ltd and not B Ltd. 
The immediate remedy under the 93 Act would be pursuant to section 292, attacking the 
payments by the company to its director and the other company as voidable preferences. The 
payments would most likely be voidable if the company went into liquidation within six 
months of their making. 324 If it could be shown that the payments were in the ordinary course 
324 
This is because the 93 Act, subsection 292(3) presumes transactions made within the restricted period (6 months 
prior to liqudiation) to be made when the company was unable to pay its debts and otherwise than in the ordinary 
course of business, unless the contrary can be proved. 
WG953 I I 0.242 
-69-
of business for the company, or liquidation was delayed until after six months from when the 
payments were made, then there is less chance of a liquidator avoiding the payments. In this 
scenario, however, an action against the director for reckless trading may also be available. If 
it is shown the payments were in the ordinary course of business then clearly "the business of 
the company" element of section 135 would appear to be satisfied. Furthermore, the facts 
would appear to create clear prejudice, and hence risk of loss, to the company's creditors. The 
payments had the effect of diminishing the assets available for the benefit of creditors upon 
the company's insolvency. The debts due to the company from the project companies would 
otherwise have been available for creditors in general upon the company's liquidation. 
D The English Cases 
J The Winkworth decision 
Winkworth was a case concerning: 
325 
Mr and Mrs W purchased the 2 issued shares of E Ltd, using money from E Ltd's bank account, and 
in doing so became E Ltd's only directors . E Ltd then purchased a freehold property which the W's 
occupied as their home. E Ltd's bank account was overdrawn as a result. On Mr W's instructions E 
Ltd's solicitors gave an undertaking to the Bank to hold the deed of the property to the order of the 
Bank. Mr W incurred considerable personal expenditure on E Ltd's account. Some months later E 
Ltd mortgaged the property to a third party with Mrs W's signature being forged on the documents by 
Mr W to pay debts incurred by Mr W. The company became insolvent and went into liquidation. 
When it defaulted in paying the mortgage, the third party brought an action for possession. Lord 
Templeman held Mr W had acted in breach of the duty he owed as a director to the company and its 
creditors to ensure that the affairs of the company would be properly administered.
325 
Clearly, this 
would be a breach of section 131 of the 93 Act. 
Winkworth , above n 83 , p 116. 
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2 The West Mercia case 
West Mercia had the following facts: 
D was a director of W Ltd. W Ltd was a wholly owned subsidiary of A Ltd, of which D was also a 
director. Both companies were in financial difficulty and insolvent. A Ltd had a substantial 
overdraft secured by D's guarantee and a charge on its book debts (which included a debt of about 
£30,000 owed by W Ltd). An accountant was called in to liquidate the companies and he informed 
the directors that the companies' bank accounts were no longer to be operated. Prior, D had 
instructed the bank to transfer £4,000, just paid to W Ltd's account by a debtor, to the overdrawn 
account of A Ltd. There was no obligation on W Ltd to do so. D's sole purpose in doing so was to 
relieve his personal liability under his guarantee. On the facts Dillon LJ said "to my mind it is quite 
clear that there was a fraudulent preference. 
11326 
It is submitted the transfer would clearly be 
recoverable by a liquidator as a transaction at an undervalue. 
E Comments As To The Relevance Of The Common Law Duty 
The fact patterns of the cases espousing a common law duty upon directors to consider the 
interests of their companies creditors do not uniformly give rise to breaches of sections 135 
and 136 of the 93 Act. However, it is submitted that, although director liability may not be 
imposed invariably under those provisions, the mischief of the directors in the cases would 
usually be impugned by some aspect of the greater regime of creditor protection provided in 
the Act.327 In Hilton, the directors would be liable for reckless trading in breach of section 
135; in Neil, primarily actions could be taken under section 297 or 298,
328 but also possibly in 
reckless trading if it was so desired; Ring v Sutton's facts would not appear to afford breaches 
of either section 135 or 136, but most likely a liquidator would have an action for breach of 
the duty to act in the best interests of the company;
329 in Kinsela, it is also likely the directors 
traded recklessly, but again, primarily, initial causes of action would be under sections 297 or 
298;330 and on Grove v Flavel's facts an action would appear to lie in voidable preference. 
326 
327 
328 
329 
JJO 
West Mercia , above n 86, p 32. 
A notable exception is the Permakraft case, which it is submitted is a case where the so called director 'mischier 
was not, as the court found , deserving of censure on the facts. 
Transactions at an undervalue, or for inadequate or excessive consideration with directors, respectively . 
93 Act, section 13 I. 
Above n 328. 
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Thus, it appears as the law stands, it gives ample scope presently to deal with all the potential 
abuses of trust or mischief (as this paper has referred to the notion) by company directors. 
There appears little need for continued judicial expression of the plight of creditors and an 
amorphous conception of a duty owed by directors to them, outside of the context of the 
statutory regime provided by the 93 Act. It is submitted, the advent of the 93 Act has and 
should signal the demise of judicial sentiment, that although understandable, was largely 
redundant and conceptually unsustainable
331 in its more extreme forms. In Sealy's words 
there seems no longer any "need to invent any new cause of action based on phoney 
. . d . 1 d .,332 Junspru entia antece ents. 
J] J 
)]2 
See the problems of owing a duty to competing interests discussed above Part II Section D Subsection I - To 
whom is the duty owed? to the company or to creditors and Part l1 Section D Subsection 3 - The extent and 
content of the duty. 
Sealy-Cambridge, above n 8, p 177. 
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V DO CREDITORS NEED PROTECTION? PLACING 
DIRECTORS' DUTIES TO CREDITORS IN THE 
CONTEXTOFTHESTAKEHOLDERSDEBATE 
A Introduction: Corporate Failure And The Focus Of Judicial Sympathies 
The body of case law this paper focuses upon has been seen to take as its starting point the 
principle that creditors are, in some circumstances, deserving of protection.333 Both prior and 
after the share market crash, the collapse of large numbers of corporations and magnitude of 
their unpaid debts obviously raised speculation as to whether directors should bear more 
responsibility for the enormous costs of such failure, both to creditors and society generally. 
In such an environment the problem has been perceived to rest squarely with directors and the 
law has responded via increasing their obligations in favour of creditors as though it was the 
natural remedy. It has been said that this "indicates a naive approach"334 and has "been 
adopted without any critical assessment of the role of the corporate creditor or the harm the 
status quo may hold for them" .
335 Moreover, in light of the continuing debate in the United 
States, it cannot be said that the principle is self evident. There, the debate is divided between 
those who view the market as providing all necessary protection and those who perceive the 
existing forms of protection available to creditors to be only partially effective. 
B Preliminary Viewpoints As To The Need For Creditor Protection 
1 Proponents that the market is adequate protection 
Proponents of the notion that the market will adequately protect creditors do so from an 
analysis premised on risk and who bears it. The likes of Posner
336 and Easterbrook and 
Fischei337 approach the issue by noting that the interest rate charged on any advances to a 
company is payment in advance, not only for the rental of capital, but also for the risk that the 
lJJ 
ll4 
JJS 
336 
JJ7 
See above Part II section 3 - the Courts' Extension Of Directors' Duties To Include Creditors. 
M Byrne "An Economic Analysis Of Directors' Duties In Favour Of Creditors" ( 1994) 4 Aust J Corp L 275 
("Byrne"), p 275 . 
Grantham, above n 34, p I. 
RA Posner "The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations" ( 1976) 42 U Chic LR 499 ("Posner 1976") and 
Economic Analysis of Law, 4th ed, Little, Brown & Co, Boston, 1992, Chpt 14. 
F H Easterbrook and D R Fischel "Limited Liability And The Corporation" 53 U Chic LR 89 ("Easterbrook & 
Fischel"). 
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borrower company will not repay the advances. Increases in risk are therefore matched by 
increases in interest rates, so that the creditor is theoretically relatively non-plussed about the 
actual outcome of the venture.
338 
Further, because of the relationship between risk and 
interest, it is actually the company borrower that bears the risk of the advance. So an increase 
in interest rate occasioned by, either, the company undertaking a risky venture or its general 
lack of credibility, reduces the value of the company to its shareholders (owners) and thus 
there exists incentive for the borrower to adopt low variance projects and conduct that 
, , , fid 339 otherwise mspires con 1 ence. The market supporters therefore conclude that, absent 
misrepresentation by the borrower company of facts relevant to risk assessment, company 
creditors will be adequately protected. 
340 
Such reliance on shareholder constraint of director 
conduct appears misplaced if reference is made to the cases in which director misconduct has 
arisen. For example, the cases evidencing the common law duty to consider creditors' 
interests invariably involve closely controlled companies where there is often perfect 
correlation between the directors and shareholders.341 In such circumstances, shareholder 
restraint of director conduct is illusory. 
2 The shortcomings of market restraints 
Against this idealised view of a perfect market in which all participants have complete 
information and are fully compensated for the level of risk they choose to bear, are some 
cogent criticisms of the market's ability to provide adequate protection. The critics assert 
there will be situations where the interest rate provided does not accurately reflect the level of 
risk undertaken so enabling the company to extemalise342 the cost of the borrowing. There 
are two grounds for their criticism. 
The first is that the market can only accurately assess the interest rate where full information 
is available about the nature of the investment, the borrower company's ability to reach 
JJS 
339 
340 
341 
342 
Posner 1976, above n 336, p 50 I. 
Posner 1976, above n 336, p 509; Easterbrook & Fischel, above n 337, p 105. 
Posner 1976, above n 336, p 521 . 
See Permakraft, above n 59; Hilton, above n 68; Neil, above n 65; Ring v Sutton 41 , above n; Kinsela, above n 45; 
and Winkworth, above n 83, for example. 
"Externality " has been defined as: 
A side effect or consequences (of an industrial or commercial activity) which affects other parties without 
this being reflected in the cost or price of the goods or services involved. 
See The New Shorter Oxford Dictionary M Lindsay (ed), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993. 
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completion and the company's general financial position. Thus, in the absence of full 
information, it follows that the interest rate will not always be capable of reflecting the actual 
risk. It should be noted the efficient markets hypothesis343 which, if true, supports an 
argument of accurate pricing, is coming under increasing criticism both as to its empirical 
claims and theoretical basis. The second criticism is that the rate of interest charged to the 
company only reflects the risk perceived by the creditor at the time the loan was made. 
Unforeseen changes (increases) in that risk effectively lowers the rate of interest, which 
transfers the cost of the debt to the creditor. 344 
In response, Posner et al suggest that informational deficiencies which result in inadequate 
interest rates can be rectified by contract. Covenants which preserve the debt equity ratio 
upon which the interest rate is determined can be included in loan documentation. In reply, 
the critics of market restraints refer to empirical evidence which suggests the use of such 
covenants, at least amongst lenders in the United States, is not widespread.345 Moreover, such 
covenants are inappropriate for trade creditors, being the type of creditor least equipped to 
assess risk and therefore in most need of protection.346 Indeed, thus far, the preliminary 
viewpoints of each have been in the context of solvent entities. The onset of insolvency 
changes this analysis. Specifically, with reference to the reckless trading offence, in 
particular, it will be the trade creditors who are most prejudiced by the company continuing to 
trade on once it should have been liquidated.347 
C Limited Liability Of The Company: The Crux Of Creditors' Problems 
In identifying the extent of the problem of company failure for creditors the fundamental issue 
is the limited liability of the company. Although the advantages of limited liability are 
generally premised on the economic benefit that accrues from being able to mobilise 
343 
344 
345 
346 
347 
The efficient markets hypothesis, or EMH, postulates (in its semi-strong) form that all relevant information will be 
available to the market and that the market will rapidly, if not instantaneously, digest all information as it becomes 
available. 
JM Landers "Another Word On Parents, Subsidiaries and Affiliates In Bankruptcy" (1978) 43 U Chic L R 527 
("Landers"), pp 530 & 531 
Grantham, above n 34, p 3, fn 12. 
Landers, above n 344, pp 530 and 540. 
See above Part III Section 5 - Application by the courts of the reckless trading offence: the leading cases under 
paragraph 320( I )(b ). 
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diversified groups of capital contributors without endangering their reserved resources,348 the 
nature of limited liability companies causes the risk of the ventures to be borne predominantly 
by the creditors.
349 
Sealy has noted, however:350 
"that for all the prominence given in the books to the phenomenon of 'lifting the veil: the one 
unassailable concept in our company law appears to be that of limited liability ... Statutory exceptions 
apart, Salomon 
351 
rules. Limited liability is sacrosanct." 
But the distribution of risk itself is not perceived as the problem. Rather, it is only when 
creditors are bearing risks for which they are not compensated in some way ( e.g., increased 
interest rates or additional security) that creditors suffer.352 As such, the limited liability of 
companies at law simply effects the initial allocation of risk. For advocates of market 
restraint, the rules of law have little impact on the final allocation of risk, as parties will 
contract around the legal regime to maximise their utility provided the costs of doing so do 
not exceed the benefits. 353 However, trade creditors, unlike secured creditors, are typically 
going to be supplying on standard terms and conditions determined by market practice. 
Indeed trade creditor initiatives to protect themselves from company insolvency risk, i.e., 
Romalpa clauses, have only been of limited effect in displacing the allocation of risk 
established at law by the likes of the 93 Act, for example. 
As such, the reality is of course that the market is not perfect. This is most emphasised where 
the company borrower approaches insolvency. In this situation the self interest argument, that 
riskier undertakings increase borrowing costs (interest rates) for the company and reduce the 
company's value to its owners, the shareholders, is premised upon a continuation of company 
business, and so to that extent is inapplicable. So with pending insolvency, and no long term 
horizon for directors to consider, it is rational for the company to undertake riskier projects in 
the hope, albeit remote that the potentially large returns will stave off insolvency. Limited 
348 
349 
350 
35 1 
352 
353 
See HA J Ford & RP Austin Ford's Principles of Corporation Law, 6th ed, Butterworths, Sydney, 1992 ("Ford"), 
p 84, para 408; p Halpern, M Trebilcock and S Turnball "An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability In 
Corporation Law" (1980) 30 U Tor LJ 117 ("Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnball"), p 125. 
Landers, above n 344, p 529. 
L S Sealy "Directors Wider Responsibilities" ( 1987) 13 Monash ULR I 65 , p 180. 
Salomon v Salomon & Co [ I 887] AC 22, where it was confirmed that registration of a company would enable the 
sole trader to obtain the benefits of limited liability. 
Byrne, above n 334, p 276. 
See R H Coase "The Problem of Social Cost" ( 1960) 3 J of Law & Econ I ("Coase"), p 18 cited in Byrne, above n 
334, p 276, fn 5. 
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liability is the basis of such a decision. Upon insolvency the shareholders' investment is 
already lost and there are no additional risks to shareholders from using what is essentially the 
creditors' money in a last ditch rescue bid. Thus, the onset of insolvency has the effect of 
altering the company's motives and there are relative gains for externalising the cost of 
borrowing to create uncompensated risks for the creditor. There are basically two ways in 
which this harm to creditors may be occasioned. 
D Problems Faced By Creditors: Decreasing Assets And Increasing Liabilities 
Though the circumstances whereby directors' conduct may harm creditors can be conveniently 
divided into two categories, they are, as Grantham notes, merely different facets of the same 
problem.
354 
The first is by reducing the company's assets. For example, the assets from 
which the creditor can be repaid may be dissipated by sales at undervalues, dividends, or the 
granting of security over them. It has long been recognised by legislatures throughout the 
Commonwealth and in the United States as well355 that this facet is undesirable.356 
The second situation is where the company debtor continues to incur liabilities after the initial 
advance from the creditor. Like diminishing the company's assets, this similarly increases the 
company's debt equity ratio, in tum raising the risk associated with the company and lowering 
the value of the interest rate paid to the creditor. Some commentators have noted that this 
second situation has been largely ignored by the law to date.
357 For example, McPherson 
concluded:358 
354 
355 
356 
357 
158 
It is profligate use of corporate power to incur liabilities that presents both courts and legislatures 
with the most pressing contemporary problem in company law. 
Grantham, above n 34, p 3; cf B M McPherson "Duties of Directors to Shareholders and Creditors" in Legal 
Research Foundation Company and Securities Law After The Market Crash, Legal Research Foundation Inc, 
Auckland, 1989 ("McPherson"), pp 8-18. 
See R C Clarke "The Duties Of The Corporate Debtor To Its Creditors" ( I 976) 90 Harv LR 505. See also above 
Part llI Section F - Other Relevant 93 Act Provisions: The Greater Scheme of Creditor Protection, for provisions 
of the 93 Act prohibiting such dissipation of assets. 
For example, in New Zealand the 93 Act proscribes transactions at undervalue - section 297, voidable charges -
section 293 and regulates dividends - sections 53 & 52. 
See Grantham, above n 34, p 4. 
McPherson, above n 354, p 14. 
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And he continued to proclaim:359 
It would require bold interpretation of the underlying thesis of companies legislation for a court to 
condemn as legally improper the exercise of corporate power to accumulate liabilities once it was 
evident that the company could never succeed in discharging them. 
By contrast, Grantham has suggested that creditor protection will only be warranted, first 
when it is effective immediately before and during insolvency, and secondly, if, in that period, 
the company's ability to incur additional liabilities is restricted. The respective commentators 
musings may well be contradicted and met respectively, by the duties comprised in sections 
135 and 136 of the 93 Act. Verily, section 136 prohibits directors from agreeing to the 
company incurring obligations unless the directors could objectively believe the company will 
be able to perform those obligations. Moreover, it is apparent McPherson's "bold 
interpretation of the underlying thesis of companies legislation" seems to have been with us 
for some time, ifreference is made to paragraph 320(1)(a) of the 55 Act, for example. The 93 
Act appears to specifically address both commentators concerns. 
E The Role Of Directors And The Costs Of Increasing Liability 
The role and duties of directors needs to be, and should be, analysed within a wider risk 
sharing context.360 Although it is easy enough to identify the concerns of creditors, it is 
another thing to advocate that increased directors' responsibilities are necessarily the 
appropriate corrective measure. If it is shown that directors are responsible for the concerns 
of creditors, it would be logical to restrain the actions of directors to prevent that harm. 
However, the costs of such restraint should also be considered prior to its imposition. As 
noted, the duties upon directors in favour of creditors describe the initial allocation of risk 
imposed by law.361 What is important, according to advocates of market restraint such as 
Posner, is how that initial allocation of risk is dealt with by the parties in their bargains. The 
parties must be able to properly factor in those duties in reaching an acceptable final risk 
sharing arrangement. Unless the initial allocation of risk reflects the optimal position for the 
359 
360 
361 
McPherson, above n 354, p 14. 
See above Part Ill Section F - Other Relevant 93 Act Provisions: The Greater Scheme of Creditor Protection. 
Coase, above n 353, p 3. 
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parties, there will be costs involved in doing so. Thus, the issue becomes the ability of the 
parties to properly contract around ever increasing directors' duties and the associated costs of 
t. 362 It . h . . so contrac mg. 1s, owever, appropnate to first examme whether directors are the sole 
cause of creditors' problems. 
J The question of causation 
Prior to determining how director conduct should be restrained, it should first be demonstrated 
that directors are responsible for the creditor concerns outlined above.363 If directors derive 
no utility from the costs incurred upon creditors, it is not rational that they act to cause them. 
It is, however, submitted that directors, in certain circumstances, will have the necessary 
incentives to cause creditors to undervalue their risk. Factors relevant to directors' incentives 
would be the size of company being managed, the directors' interest in the company and the 
form of directors' remuneration or compensation.364 For example, in closely held companies 
where directors are also shareholders, there is considerable incentive to increase the creditors' 
risk. This is certainly the effect evident from the cases in which the judiciary have supported 
a common law duty. In the context of closely held companies, contract arguably provides an 
effective means by which creditors could avoid these competing incentives, however, via 
creditors, for example, insisting on personal guarantees from the directors of the company. 
This has the effect of aligning creditors' concerns with the directors' interests. But director 
guarantees can also be a double edged sword. For example, in Winkworth, a personal 
guarantee of another company in the group was the incentive for breach of the director's duty. 
For directors of large public companies, if it is assumed that such directors' utility is 
maximised directly in proportion to the success of the company (which will be dependent on 
the compensation package of the director) the personal benefit to the director will be strongly 
linked to the performance of the company. Conduct likely to result in the failure of the 
h h d. ' . 36s Th d' ' company is said to not appear to furt er t e irectors own mterests. us, 1rectors 
attitudes in publicly listed companies appear governed largely by the way they are 
362 
36] 
364 
365 
Byrne, above n 334, p 279. 
See above Part V Section D - Problems Faced by Creditors: Decreasing Assets and Increasing Liabilities. 
Byrne, above n 334, p 279. 
It may well be that the shareholders of such a company may feel aggrieved by inappropriate risk aversion from the 
directors. Shareholders, unlike creditors, may vent their dissatisfaction by voting the director out at general 
meeting, however. 
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compensated. Disproportionately large bonuses or other rewards may serve to align directors' 
interest with shareholders' interests, which may have the effect of increasing directors' 
propensity to adopt risk, to the detriment of creditors. If directors are being compensated to 
carry out risky ventures for the benefit of shareholders, it may be equally appropriate to 
require such directors to bear responsibility for this behaviour. It is, however, difficult to 
assess the validity of the argument because, as noted, the preponderance of the cases where 
directors' obligations to creditors have been at issue have involved closely held companies. 
2 Are current attempts to restrain directors the appropriate corrective measures? 
If it is assumed directors have a role in causing the problems faced by creditors, what is the 
appropriate method by which directors can be restrained? As we have seen, the response of 
the common law, and latterly of the legislature, has been to impose directors' duties which 
increase the responsibilities of directors, to the benefit of creditors. 
With regard to the common law duty, perhaps the most striking element of its approach is the 
obsession with the insolvency of the company. This focus is premised on the belief that at 
the point of insolvency the assets of the company should be available for the exclusive benefit 
of creditors. It has been said this "oversimplifies the analysis and overstates the significance 
of insolvency". 366 Insolvency is, rather, the time when the loss manifests itself. If it is 
accepted that creditors suffer only when they have been caused to accept risks for which they 
have not been fully compensated, the attention should only be on uncompensated risks.
367 
As 
such, this problem exists whether the company is solvent or not. Substantively, the only 
difference between solvency and insolvency is that, in one instance, the increased risks 
imposed upon creditors by directors in undertaking higher risk ventures on behalf of the 
company, if they are proved fruitful, the directors are not perceived to have acted improperly, 
whereas if those same high risk ventures fail , and the company becomes insolvent, the 
directors' initial decision is analysed as being potentially in breach of their duty . Byrne 
argues, therefore, that it is inappropriate for the common law duty to focus upon insolvency, 
as it is inequitable to impose the duty on grounds not connected with conduct.
368 
The law, 
366 
367 
368 
Byrne, above n 334, p 280. Byrne submits the insolvency is not the cause of the loss. 
See Coase, above n 353 . 
Byrne, above n 334, p 280. 
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however, has always differentiated between conduct and its consequences. The criminal law 
distinction between full offences and mere attempts is the best example. Although 
theoretically unexpected director risk adoption that begets success on the one hand, but also 
failure on the other, is equally blameworthy. However, in one scenario, the creditors bear no 
tangible loss beyond the 'additional uncompensated risk' they bear with is, arguably no 
detriment at all. 
The importance of solvency of the company is said to be, rather, that it highlights the last act 
of obtaining credit which pushes the company into insolvency.369 A duty upon directors may 
therefore be of benefit to creditors if it provides directors with an incentive to more closely 
monitor the financial state of the company. Certainly, this would appear to be the substantive 
effect of the 93 Act's section 135 and 136 provisions.370 However, there remains no link with 
the most crucial factor of the analysis, which is the risk a creditor was prepared to accept. If a 
creditor, for example, has recognised the full risk and contracted on the basis that the 
company may technically be fluctuating in and out of solvency, it is arguable that creditor 
should not be entitled to other remedies. The creditor has made a fully informed decision on 
the risks known to it. A duty owed by directors to creditors thus conceivably provides 
creditors with a remedy to which they should not be entitled. It is, in a sense, a "second 
chance" for the creditor. Moreover, if it is acknowledged that director liability may eventuate 
whether or not the creditor negligently or naively failed to undertake proper inquiry (as would 
be expected of the "average" creditor), this proposition is more alarming. However, in 
practice, it is submitted there are unlikely to be many creditors willing to advance funds 
knowing the borrower is fluctuating in and out of solvency. This paper has highlighted the 
responsibility of directors to avail themselves of the true position of the company and its 
financial solvency. By contrast little commentary has been devoted to the ability of creditors 
to take appropriate steps in appraising their risks and protect themselves. 
]69 
370 
Byrne, above n 334, p 280. 
See above Part III - The Companies Act 1993 And Statutory Based Directors' Duties For The Benefit Of Creditors. 
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3 The total cost of increasing directors' duties 
a increased compensation and insurance and indemnities 
The foregoing analysis is premised upon the basis that the imposition of liability upon 
directors will provide the necessary incentive for them to comply with the desired behaviour. 
It has been suggested that there are some significant flaws in such an approach. 37 1 The 
consequence of the imposition of increased directors' duties is that directors bear increased 
risks and obligations. Yet, directors are said to be extremely poor risk bearers. 372 Directors' 
personal liability is unlimited. Moreover, if they are in the service of a single company, they 
are unable to diversify their investment and spread their risks. The result would be that 
directors would need increased compensation for their increased risks, and such 
compensation would probably be relatively high, given directors inability to avoid the 
potential liability or reduce its impact. An alternative is for shareholders to indemnify 
directors for their liability.
373 
Insurers and shareholders, being good risk bearers, 374 are said 
to be able to assume this role much more cheaply. Thus, shareholders will prefer to provide 
an indemnity or pay insurance rather than compensate directors directly. This could be 
viewed as internalising the cost of the directors' risk in an equitable manner.
375 
371 
372 
373 
374 
375 
See Byrne, above n 334. 
RH Kraakman "Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls" (1984) 93 Yale L J 857. 
See the 93 Act, section 162. Indemnification, however, is only available for director liability to any person other 
than the company, subsection 162(4), and, at least in respect of the statutory duties imposed by sections 135 and 
136 of the 93 Act, these are duties owed to the company. Indemnification would arguably, however, be available 
for liability pursuant to section 30 I to a creditor in an action against a director for misfeasance in respect of a 
breach of sections 135 or 136 of the 1993 Act. 
See Kraakman, above n 372. 
The risk has appeared to move the full circle. Creditors initially bear extra risk due to the limited liability of the 
company. In a perfect market, creditors would be fully compensated for their risk. However, in the real world, 
high transaction costs and incentives within the company structure for directors to engage in riskier ventures, 
mean creditors may be viewed as suffering under a bias. The bias favours the shareholder given the potential for 
higher returns. This is even more likely to occur where the directors' interests are aligned to those of the 
shareholders via fear of removal or share value related compensation packages. To allow directors to be liable to 
creditors fo/ creditor loss but to transfer the cost of such liability to the shareholders by way of indemnity or 
insurance (which would be paid directly by the company or indirectly via increased salaries) is to make the 
shareholders pay for the original benefit. Thus the circle is complete. See Byrne, above n 334, p 283. T~e 
foregoing analysis is, however, premised on perfect transfers of risk. It is unlikely there could ever be a total shift 
of risk by indemnities or insurance and the extent to which this cannot occur will be reflected in more costly 
corporate governance. 
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b making directors risk averse: fettering risk taking 
Beyond the increased cost of insurance or indemnities, it may be argued that the more serious 
cost of increasing directors' duties to creditors is upon the performance of the directors. 
Increased liability will beget increased incentive to avoid higher risk ventures and their 
associated greater chance of financial failure. Such a cost, it is submitted, threatens the basis 
of capitalist enterprise, notwithstanding the problems there would be in quantifying such a 
cost.376 For example, Sealy has warned: 377 
Any reformulation of directors' duties to take account of the interests of creditors and others has to 
accommodate the concept of risk, and allow for the fact that directors must be free to take risks and to 
judge what risks their business should take. We must not loose sight of the fact that it is the principal 
function of the limitation liability company, and of company law, to facilitate this risk taking; 
without it, the world's railways would not have been built and we would have had no industrial 
revolution, no modern technology. It is impossible to reconcile a duty of care towards creditors with 
h . . if . k 378 t 1s not10n o ns . 
F Final Policy Comments 
Byrne has suggested that the limited liability structure results in a slight bias against 
creditors, as they are prejudiced only when they take on risk which cannot be incorporated 
into the credit contract at the time it is created. It is argued the bias is slight, because there 
are means available to the creditor to overcome this initial allocation ofrisk.
379 However, the 
propensity of certain types of creditors, most particularly trade creditors, to contract around 
this bias must be questioned. Moreover, contractual solutions can be just as problematic 
where group company situations are involved, as, for example, contractual risk adjustment in 
376 
377 
378 
379 
Quantification of the cost would be relevant if it is to be balanced against the benefits afforded to creditors by the 
imposition if increased duties. 
Sealy-Monash, above n 91 , p 181 ( emphasis added). 
It is on such grounds that a "business judgment rule" has appeal. Such a rule allows a director to be able lo defend 
what might otherwise be considered risky decisions given the particular circumstances of the occasion. Director 
conduct may be defended on the basis of the circumstances that existed at the time of their decision. In the United 
States, the American business judgment rule protects all decisions from being in breach of duty unless they may 
be considered to have reached a level comparable to gross negligence. 
For example, in the context of closely helped companies, personal guarantees help to realign creditor and director 
interests. 
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one case by way of a personal guarantee of one group company provided director incentive 
for misconduct in relation to another. 380 
Byrne has also suggested that the attempts to redress the problems faced by creditors should 
focus on the directors' role in allowing creditors to assume uncompensated risks.381 The 
common law duty and the courts' interpretations of the statutory duties, with their focus upon 
the solvency of the company although said to assist creditors to identify subsequent risk, is 
aimed at the fact that creditors' advances may not be repaid, rather than creditors being 
insufficiently compensated for their risks to begin with. Moreover, it is apparent directors 
can still be rewarded for misleading creditors when their risky ventures are successful. With 
respect, however, directors are rewarded for misleading creditors whether the venture 
succeeds or fails, because in both situations they obtain creditor financing at a discounted rate 
to that which would reflet the company's "true" risk. Creditors must ultimately be concerned 
with being repaid, and the law's, and especially the duties provided by sections 135 and 136 
of the 93 Act, are it is submitted a pragmatic and appropriate approach. 
380 
381 
See Winkworth , above n 83 . 
See Byrne, above n 334. 
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VI FINAL COMMENTS 
A The Common Law Duty Regarding Creditors: 
The cases surveyed
382 
in this paper illustrate there was a considerable amount of judicial 
sympathy amongst New Zealand, Australian and English courts to the notion that directors of 
companies owe a duty to consider the interests of their companies' creditors, at least when the 
company is insolvent. The concept, however, is at best nebulous. The various commentary 
from the bench, proffered by legal academics as formulating the duty, are upon examination, 
only obiter dicta. The cases provide no instance where the concept has been fundamental to 
imposing liability upon directors. As would be expected of such a situation, it is extremely 
difficult to tie down what conduct the duty would prescribe. More problematic, are some of 
the conceptual difficulties. If directors owe a duty to creditors, or rather to consider creditors' 
interests, what becomes of the usual formulation that it is the company to which all directors' 
duties are owed? To subscribe the creditors' interests as those of the company's, is to ignore 
significant other stakeholders, most notably shareholders. If it is posited that the duty is to 
consider creditors' interests amongst other interests, the issue becomes how those interests, 
which may very well be in opposition, be balanced? It appears the courts were moving 
towards a formulation that the weight accorded creditors' interests increased proportionately 
the closer the company got to insolvency. The issue of remedies is also pertinent. Sealy 
noted duty without a remedy was a nonsense.383 However, the misfeasance action provided 
by section 301 of the 93 Act may well rebuff this attack. Indeed, despite the amorphous 
nature of the judicial commentary exposing the duty, the basic notion that creditors deserve to 
expect certain minimum levels of behaviour from the directors of their company debtors is 
commendable. To that end, though, it is superfluous to greater the statutory regime of creditor 
protection provided in the 93 Act. 
382 
383 
e.g. Walker v Wimborne, Ring v Sutton , Kinsela, Grove v Flavel, llilton, Permakraji , Neil, Winkworth , West 
Marcia, discussed generally above Part II Section C - The Courts' Extension of Directors' Duties To Include 
Creditors. 
Sealy-Monash, above n 9 I, p I 77. 
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B The 93 Act's Duties and Its Greater Scheme For Preventing Director Misconduct 
It has been suggested the 93 Act's express exposition of directors' duties is an innovation in 
New Zealand company law and to some extent this is true. However, reality is that New 
Zealand statute has for some time provided obligations upon directors in relation to their 
conduct, though under the less recognisable guise of provisions like section 320(1)(b) and 
320(1 )( a), respectively. 
If anything, however, the duty provided in section 135 of the 93 Act is broader than its 
predecessor. When it applies has obviously expanded, but this, it is submitted, will not effect 
any substantive charge for creditors, as their means ofremedy, section 301, is only applicable 
on the liquidation of the company. More importantly, the requisite degree of knowledge 
before liability will be imposed appears reduced by the use of "allow" in the new provisions. 
As to the other aspects of the sections, the adoption of "the" as opposed to "any" business of 
the company is unlikely to be interpreted by the courts due to the section's remedial nature, 
whilst the meaning of "substantial risk of serious loss" will have a ready proxy available in 
Bisson J's test from Thompson v Innes and the body of precedent developed under paragraph 
320(1)(b) of the 55 Act. 
Less perfect is the match between paragraph 320(1)(a) of the 55 Act and section 136 of the 93 
Act. Identical comments as to when it applies can be made in respect of section 136 as for 
section 135. The charge from "debts" to "obligations" is potentially expansive, but it is yet to 
be seen whether the courts will be so inclined. The primacy of financial date in assessing the 
requisite ability or not for company performance of the obligation will arguably mean the 
section will predominantly focus still upon financial obligations. Similarly, case law decided 
under the 55 Act, such as Petherick and Vinyl Processors will continue to be relevant in 
applying the new sections. These parameters given, is there any room left, for the common 
law? 
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C The Demise Of Redundant Judicial Sympathies 
The case supportive of the common law duty nigh invariably evidenced a range of director 
misconduct in order to illicit the judicial sympathies as to the plight of the creditors involved 
and the directors' obligations thereto. However, application of the various provisions 
available under the 93 Act to the cases' fact patterns, illustrates that in all instances when the 
deciding courts thought fit to impose liability (and it should be noted, not one did so on the 
basis of a breach of a directors' duty to creditors), the 93 Act would similarly impose 
liability.
384 
As the law stands, it appears to give the courts ample scope to deal with the vast 
majority of potential director abuses of position without, to paraphrase Sealy, the need to 
invent any new cause of action based on phoney jurisprudential antecedents. The advent of 
the 93 Act, and sections 135 and 136 will allow for developments in this area to proceed on a 
statutory footing, properly integrated against the backdrop of corporate insolvency law as a 
whole. ~this light, well meant but ill focussed dicta about directors' "duties" to creditors may 
be seen as both unnecessary and potentially permc10us. The demise of such redundant 
judicial sympathies appears complete. 
384 See above Part IV _ An Analysis Of The Continued Relevance Of the Common Law Duty Regarding Creditors: 
Does It Add Anything To The 93 Act? 
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